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AUTOMATIC STA VS UNDER THE 
NEW BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Frank R. Kennedy* 
I. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
In Mueller v. Nugent,1 decided shortly after the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the United States Supreme Court declared 
that a petition in bankruptcy is "a caveat to all the world, and in 
effect an attachment and injunction." This judicial gloss, much 
quoted and applied since, was an early recognition that a stay of 
creditors from collecting their claims against the debtor and his 
property from and after the filing of a petition under the Bank-
ruptcy Act is indispensable to bankruptcy administration. Unless 
the creditors are stayed, the debtor's estate will be dismembered 
and the objective of equality of distribution defeated. The fresh 
start sought by the bankrupt in invoking the bankruptcy laws is 
likely to be compromised by permitting the continuation of actions 
against him. All the property of the bankrupt in his possession is 
brought into the custody of the bankruptcy court by the filing of the 
petition, and no interference with that custody can be counte-
nanced without the court's permission. The bankruptcy court's 
control has been buttressed with statutory power and inherent 
power as a court of equity to enjoin litigation and acts of creditors 
and others insofar as necessary to effectuate bankruptcy objec-
tives. 2 
When Congress exercised its bankruptcy power by amendment 
• Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
1 184 U.S. I, 14 (1901). 
• See §§ 2a(15) and I la of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U .S.C. §§ II (a)(15), 29(a) (1976). This is 
the last time that citation to II U.S.C. will be made in this article when the intended refer-
ence is to the Bankruptcy Act. The numbering of the sections of the Bankruptcy Act differs 
from their numbers in II U .S.C., and the numbering of the Bankruptcy Act, which corres-
ponds to the original numbering in the legislation as enacted in the Statutes at Large, is that 
generaUy used in judicial opinions, briefs, treatises, and the literature about the bankruptcy 
Jaws. See note 7 infra in regard to subsequent references in this article to 11 U.S.C. 
3 
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of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 during the decade of the thirties to 
authorize reorganization of financially distressed debtors, it ex-
tended the bankruptcy court's protection of the debtor an,d its 
property by granting exclusive jurisdiction of both to the bank-
ruptcy court from the filing of the petition3 and by supplementing 
the injunctive powers of the bankruptcy court .4 In two reorganiza-
tion chapters, the court provided for automatic stays. 5 Congress 
thus recognized that continuation of the debtor's enterprise during 
the pendency of the reorganization case was crucial to any realistic 
hope for rehabilitation. In actual practice under the reorganization 
chapters, counsel for petitioners routinely sought and obtained 
comprehensive injunctions at the threshold of the case against ac-
tions of creditors and others and against acts enforcing liens or 
otherwise interfering with the estate of the debtor. 
The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure promulgated during the 
years 1973 to 1976 formalized prevailing practice in bankruptcy and 
reorganization cases by providing an automatic stay of most ac-
tions and proceedings against the debtor and the enforcement of 
liens against the property of the debtor from the filing of the peti-
tion.6 The Rules made a significant procedural change, however, 
by requiring the person objecting to. the stay to file a complaint 
seeking relief from the stay, though the burden of justification for 
continuing the stay after the filing of such a complaint rests on the 
party seeking its continuation where the stay operates against lien 
enforcement. 
the automatic stay rules have generated extensive litigation in 
the bankruptcy courts. They appropriately bring before the court 
early in any bankruptcy or reorganization case the clash between 
secured creditors and others seeking to establish a right to prefer-
ential treatment as against other creditors and claimants against the 
debtor and his property. Nevertheless, the .automatic stay rules 
have been given sympathetic application, and Congress has with 
passage of a new bankruptcy law7 conferred statutory status on the 
3 See §§ 77(a), lll, 311, 411, and 611 of the Bankruptcy Act, discussed in Kennedy, The 
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, ll U. MICH. J.L. REF. 175, 189 n.65 (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as Automatic Stay []. 
4 See§§ 77(j), 113, 116(4), 314,414,614 of the Bankruptcy Act, discussed in Automatic Stay 
I, supra note 3, at 189 n.66. 
5 See §§ 148 and 428 of the Bankruptcy Act, discussed in Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, 
at 192-94. 
6 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 190 n. 78. 
7 Pub. L, No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549(1978). Section 40l(a) repeals the Bankruptcy Act. For 
most purposes the repeal is effective as of October l, 1979. The Bankruptcy Act is the title 
given to the act "to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United 
States," approved July l, 1898, as amended many times before and since 1950. 64 Stat. 1113 
(1950). The new law contains four titles. Section IOI of the new law enacts Title I, which is a 
codification and enactment of Title II of the United States Code, entitled "Bankruptcy." 
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automatic stay for all classes of cases commenced under the bank-
ruptcy laws.8 
The provisions for stays in the new law follow recommendations 
of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. 9 
At the time the Commission submitted its Report five of the au-
tomatic stay rules had been proposed,10 but none of the Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure had become effective. The derivation of the 
Commission's proposal for a general automatic stay from the au-
tomatic stay rules that had been published for study and comment 
by the bench and bar was obvious and was acknowledged in the 
Commission's Report. 11 The Commission proposed no change in 
the grant of rule-making authority to the Supreme Court respecting 
Sections 201-252 of the new law enact Title II, and amend Title 28 of the United States Code 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Sections 301-338 enact Title III, and amend the provi-
sions in titles of the United States Code other than Titles 11 and 28. Sections 401-411 of the 
new law are transitional provisions, all embraced in Title IV of the new law. 
The words "Bankruptcy Act" are useci in this article exclusively to refer to the statutory 
provisions that are repealed by Public Law 95-598. "Title 11 of the United States Code," 
"Title 11," and "11 U.S.C." or "11 U.S.C.A." are used in this article to refer to the provi-
sions that are enacted by § 101 of Public Law 95-598. References to "Title 28 of the United 
States Code," "Title 28," and "28 U .S.C." in this article refer, unless the context otherwise 
indicates, to provisions of this title as amended by Title 11 of Public Law 95-598. 
8 The relevant sections of the new law, are 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 362, 922, 1301 (West Supp. 
1979). 
9 The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created by Act of July 
24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970), proposed a comprehensive revision of the 
bankmptcy laws in Part II of its report, which contained a draft of a proposed Bankruptcy 
Act of 1973. H.R. Doc. No. 137, pts. I & II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
COMMISSION REPORT I and COMMISSION REPORT II]. 
The Commission proposed a general automatic stay of actions and lien enforcement in 
§ 4-501 of its proposed Bankruptcy Act. COMMISSION REPORT II, at 117-23. The proposal 
was included in H.R. 10792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and in H.R. 31 and S. 
236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). It appeared in practically identical form in a bill proposed 
by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and introduced as H.R. 16643 and S. 4046, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), and as H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The 
essential features of this proposal were carried forward in H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 8200 and S. 2266], which have been enacted 
by Congress as Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 362, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
The Commission proposed no special provision for a stay in the chapter for adjustment of 
debts of public agencies and instrumentalities and political subdivisions, since it recom-
mended that the general stay provisions of§ 4-501 should apply in cases under that chapter. 
COMMISSION REPORT II§ 8-101, at 263. There was thus no counterpart of 11 u.s.c. § 922 in 
the Commission's Bankruptcy Act of 1973. 
The Commission's proposal for an automatic stay of creditors' collection from codebtors 
was set out in§ 6-208. COMMISSION REPORT II at 214. It is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 210-13 infra. 
10 The Commission's Report was submitted in July of 1973. Rules 401, 601, and 13-401 of 
the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure had been transmitted by the Supreme Court to Congress 
on April 24, 1973, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976) and became effective on October 1, 
1973. 411 U.S. 990 (1973); H.R. Doc. No. 87, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). [Hereinafter, the 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will be referred to as Rules or as Bankr. Rules]. Drafts of 
Rules 10-401 and 11-44 had been circulated to the bench and bar but had not yet been submit-
ted by the Judicial Conference to the Supreme Court for its approval and transmission to 
Congress. 
11 COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 118. 
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the practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act, 12 and the 
proposals of the Commission for statutory provisions for stays 
were not intended to restrict the Supreme Court's power to pre-
s~ribe new and different rules respecting stays in cases arising 
tinder the bankruptcy laws. 
While sections 362 and 922 of the new law at least bear the im-
print of the automatic stay rules that have been promulgated and 
applied during the last half-dozen years, the new law significantly 
changes the role of the Supreme Court in developing the law gov-
erning stays. The enabling section, 28 U .S.C. § 2075, as it has been 
amended, now restricts the authority of the Court by the deletion 
df a provision that heretofore annulled statutory law in conflict 
with the rules duly promulgated by the Court pursuant to the con-
g~essional grant. 13 The Court retains rule-making authority respect-
ir'lg practice and procedure in cases and proceedings commenced 
under Title 11, and the draftsmen of Public Law 95-598 have been 
careful to avoid elaborating procedural detail. 14 Nevertheless, the 
statutory provisions dealing with stays cover several pages. If the 
Supreme Court undertakes to promulgate any rules affecting stays, 
they can only supplement the statute in ways that do not conflict 
with it .. 
12 COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 42. The Commission's proposed§ 2-204(a) 
read as follows: "Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to govern practice and procedure in the 
bankruptcy courts may be prescribed by the Supreme Court as provided in Title 28, United 
States Code,§ 2075." 
13 The rule making authority of the Supreme Court in respect to bankruptcy procedure as 
heretofore prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976), read as follows: 
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms 
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure under the 
Bankruptcy Act. 
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. 
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the 
Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than 
the first day of May and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been 
thus reported. 
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such 
rules have taken effect. 
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 247, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), amends § 2075 in two ways. First, it 
strikes out "under the Bankruptcy Act" in the first paragraph and inserts in lieu thereof "in 
cases under Title II"; and second, it strikes out the last sentence of the section. The 
amendment became effective on enactment of Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(d), 92 Stat. 2549 
(1978). 
The scope of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976) 
before the amendment is discussed in Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 192-94. 
14 The House Report accompanying H.R. 8200 explained: "With the extensive revision 
and modernization of the bankruptcy law proposed by this bill, in which nearly all pro-
cedural matters have been removed and left to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the need 
that currently may exist to permit the Supreme Court's rules to supersede the statute disap-
pears." BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 449 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. See also id. at 292-93; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 158 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. 
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To a considerable extent, though not entirely, the amendment of 
the rule-making grant represents a regression to the law under 
which the old General Orders were promulgated by the Supreme 
Court. Until 1964, section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act authorized the 
Court to prescribe "[a]l 1 necessary rules, forms, and orders as to 
procedure and for carrying the provisions of this title into force and 
effect." That authority, however, was read to require all such 
rules, forms, and orders to conform to the statute. Thus, there 
were judicial rulings that some of the orders and forms promul-
gated by the Court pursuant to former section 30 exceeded its au-
thority .15 When Congress finally was persuaded in the early thirties 
to vest authority in the Supreme Court to make rules for civil pro-
cedure in the federal district courts, 16 it was recognized that signifi-
cant procedural reform would not be accomplished if the Court was 
not freed from the constraints imposed by the procedural law in the 
statute books. Accordingly, the enabling acts under which the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Admiralty Procedure were 
promulgated contained provisions nullifying all statutory and other 
laws in conflict with the rules.17 When Congress was persuaded to 
enact a comparable rule-making grant for practice and procedure 
under the Bankruptcy Act in 1964, the limited authority of section 
30 was superseded by section 2075 of Title 28 with a provision giv-
ing the same paramount effect to the Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure vis-a-vis "laws in conflict" as are given to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The amendment of section 2075 of Title 28 ef-
fected by the new bankruptcy law does not restore the law that 
prevailed under former section 30 o( the Bankruptcy Act, because 
the Bankruptcy Act bristles with procedural provisions in practi-
cally every section and subdivision. As previously noted, the new 
15 See, e.g., Meek v. Centre County Banking Co., 268 U.S. 426,434 (1926) (General Order 
8 and former Official Form No. 2 invalidated as not warranted by the Bankruptcy Act); 
Damon v. Damon, 283 F.2d 571,572 (1st Cir. 1960) (the scope of General Order 30 restricted 
by reference to § 9 of the Bankruptcy Act). 
16 The first enabling act, pursuant to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
originally promulgated, was enacted by Congress in 1934. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 
(1934). This grant has been extended by numerous amendments and now appears in 28 
U .S.C. § 2072 (1976). The rule-making grant for cases under the Bankruptcy Act came thirty 
years after the original enabling act. 28 U .S.C. § 2075 (1976). 
11 See 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 1.02[5] (2d ed. 1978). In identical language, sec-
tions 2072, 2073, and 2075 of Title 28 of the United States Code as originally enacted, pro-
vided that "[a]II laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after 
such rules have taken effect." These sections were the enabling acts under which the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, the Admiralty Rules, the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, and the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were promulgated. Section 2076 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code, which prescribes the Supreme Court's power respecting the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, is more guarded in its delegation of authority to the Supreme Court. The 
· history of this section is discussed in 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 45-67 (2d ed. 
1976). 
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law leaves ample room for the exercise of the Court's rule-making 
authority. 18 
The withdrawal from the Supreme Court of the power to mod-
ify any procedural provision of the statute is nevertheless a serious 
defect of the new law. The House Report declared that "[s]ince the 
Rules [of Bankruptcy Procedure] have become effective, there has 
been continual controversy." 19 If so, the controversy has been lit-
tle noted in published commentaries.20 While the House Report as-
serted that the "Rules' authors interpreted that grant [of rulemak-
ing authority] very liberally ," 21 the most extended critique of the 
Rules found the greater fault to be the narrowness of the authors' 
construction of the scope of their authority .22 A staff report of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission criticized a preliminary draft 
of the Chapter X Rules for their numerous departures from the Act 
and noted that many of the Rules dealt with matters of admi nistra-
tion quite different from the kinds of procedure and practice found 
in the Federal Rules of Procedure and other rules promulgated by 
the Supreme Court under the several enabling acts.23 The body of 
rules formulated and promulgated under each congressional grant 
has distinctive characteristics, but that fact may be acknowledged 
without conceding that only rules that follow the familiar mold of 
previously promulgated rules of procedure are valid. The House 
Report noted that several of the Rules have been challenged in the 
courts, and that "some have been declared beyond the scope of the 
rulemaking authority." 24 The correctness of these rulings need not 
18 See note 14 supra. 
19 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 292. 
20 There has been a plethora of recent commentary regarding the rule-making process as 
exercised by the Supreme Court pursuant to Congressional enabling acts. See, e.g., J. 
WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES xii, 64 (1977); C. WRIGHT, 
FEDERAL COURTS §§ 62-63 (3d ed. 1976); Freidenthal, The Rule Making Power of the Su-
preme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673 (1975); Hazard, Book Review, 
87 YALE L.J. 1284 (1978); Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-
examination, 61 A.B.A.J. 579 (1975); Weinstein, Reform of Federal Rulemaking Proce-
dures, 76 CoLUM. L. REV. 905,919 (1976). In none of these comments is there any indication 
that controversy has arisen in regard to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 
21 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 292. 
22 Landers, The New Bankruptcy Rules: Relics of the Past as Fixtures of the Future, 57 
MINN. L. REv. 827, 835-38, 867-72 (1973). . 
23 Securities Exchange Commission, Staff Report on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Chap-
ter X Rules (December 1972) ( dated July 5, 1973) at 2-5. This report was referred to in Bank-
ruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3/ and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2152, 
2205-06 (1976) (statement of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Commissioner of the SEC and Report of 
the SEC on Proposed Bankruptcy Legislation)[hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. 
•• HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 292, citing only Wolff v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re 
Moralez), I Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1210 (N.D. Cal. 1974). This ruling by Bankruptcy Judge Hughes 
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be debated here. The Rules have been generally accorded a cordial 
reception and application by the courts.25 A hyperbolic reference 
was made in the House Report to a raging controversy "on the 
issue of the propriety of the Supreme Court action undoing Acts of 
Congress, on the objectivity of the Supreme Court should it be re-
quired to rule on the validity of a Rule that it promulgated, and over 
the confusion for practitioners resulting from inconsistent laws and 
Rules. " 26 The enabling legislation explicitly reserved to Congress 
the opportunity to review any rules before they become effective,27 
and there is no serious doubt about its power to repeal any rule that 
it finds objectionable. 28 So long as any rulemaking authority is 
vouchsafed to the Supreme Court,29 question may arise as to its 
objectivity in interpreting its own rules. 30 It is appropriate for the 
new bankruptcy legislation to contain, as does the prior Act, stat-
utory authority for stays of proceedings in other courts. It is re-
grettable that Congress has set in concrete many features of the 
procedure for obtaining relief from the stay .31 
was later affirmed by the district court. Wolff v. Wells Fargo Bank, 400 F. Supp. 1352 (N:o. 
Cal. 1975), appeal dismissed, 553 F.2d I 192 (9th Cir. 1977). Contra, Ford Motor Co. v. Wall, 
403 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Garcia, 396 F. 
Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The Wall and Garcia cases are discussed in Automatic Stay l, 
supra note 3, at 256-57 & nn.401-03. 
25 The case law construing the Rules is already extensive. Six volumes of the Collier 
treatise are devoted exclusively to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Volumes 12, 13, BA, 
14, 14A, and 15). Most of the cases appearing in the 18 volumes of Collier Bankruptcy Cases, 
which commenced publication in 1974, involve an application of one or more of the Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure. The Collier treatise is now in its fourteenth edition, and its looseleaf 
feature permits continual updating as well as the publication of annual supplements for inser-
tion at the front of each of its 27 volumes. Publication of the fourteenth edition started in 
1940, and some portions of the text and footnotes have undergone numerous changes since. 
Hereinafter the Collier treatise on Bankruptcy will be cited as COLLIER with a reference to 
the volume, the pertinent section or page, and, to the extent practicable, the date of the pub-
lic~icm of the material cited. 
26 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 292. 
27 Rules proposed for promulgation by the Supreme Court must be reported to Congress 
not later than the first day of May of the year in which they are to become effective and 
generally cannot become effective until the expiration of 90 days after being reported to 
Congress. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1976). The waiting period for amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence is 180 days after being reported, and any amendment dealing with a 
privilege must be approved by Congress before it becomes effective. 28 U .S.C. § 2076 
(1976). 
28 See J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 104 (1977); C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 291 (3d ed. -1976); cf. Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Rela-
tion to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REv. 234 
(1951). 
•• As the House Report made clear, the Supreme Court's rulemaking authority is exten-
sive under Public Law No. 95-598 by virtue of the deliberate effort of the draftsmen to re-
strict the number of procedural provisions in the new law. See note 14 supra. 
30 See J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 96-104 (1977). 
31 The authors of a recently published commentary on automatic stays are also oblivious to 
the objections to freezing procedure into a statutory mold. Indeed, they proposed to elabo-
IO Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:1 
II. THE STAY OF SECTION 362 
A. Scope of the Stay 
A petition filed under Title 11 triggers an automatic stay under 
section 362, just as the filing of a petition does under the previous 
Act and the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 32 As under prior law, 
the stay becomes operative immediately whether the petition is 
voluntary or involuntary. When a petition is filed by husband and 
wife in a joint case, 33 the stay takes effect with respect to both 
debtors and their property and the property of their es-tates. Unlike 
prior law, section 362 does not recognize or permit any different 
effect to be given the stay because of the chapter under which the 
case was commenced. Any rule that would prescribe a different 
procedure for enforcing or obtaining relief from a stay by reference 
to the chapter under which the case was brought would be vulnera-
ble to challenge as in conflict with Title 11. 34 While the new bank-
ruptcy legislation imposes some limitations on the stay not found in 
the previous law, section 362 is notable for enlarging the scope of 
the stay as it applies in liquidation cases so that it generally is given 
the same effect as the stay now has in debtor relief cases.35 
rate the procedural detail by substituting a draft containing 574 wor(\s for the 353 words of 
subsections (d) through (g) of§ 362 of H.R. 8200. Peitzman & Smith, The Secured Creditor's 
Complaint: Relief from the Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 
1216, 1257-59 (1977). See note 166 infra. 
The House Hearings included objections by the Department of Justice to the retention of 
28 U.S.C. § 2075 in its present form. House Hearings, supra note 23, at 2107. The objections 
were based on three considerations: (1) The justification for allowing the Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure to supersede provisions of the present Bankruptcy Act was that "a com-
prehensive revision to harmonize provisions of the statute in the light of three quarters of a 
century of experience had not been accomplished. With the enactment of a new bankruptcy 
statute this justification disappears." (2) There is "need for one primary source for the law. 
Creditors and the bar should not have to read the statute and wonder if it has been repealed 
or modified by an obscure court rule." (3) "Statutes should not be superseded by mere court 
rules. "Id. 
The first objection ignores the fact that notwithstanding the extensive overhaul of the 
Bankruptcy Act by Congress in 1938 and numerous amendments before and since that date, 
Congress has not in the past given procedural improvement the kind of attention it con-
stantly requires. This situation is unlikely to change in the future. The second objection 
gratuitously assumes that the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are less accessible or more 
obscure than the provisions of bankruptcy legislation. The third objection is a rejection of 
the role of the courts as an innovator of procedural reform. "It cannot be doubted that legis-
lative regulation [of procedure] is less satisfactory than regulation by court-made rules." C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 291 (3d ed. 1976). 
32 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 178 & nn. 5 & 6. 
33 11 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. 1979). A single petition may be filed by a husband and 
wife to commence a joint case, and it is a matter of judicial discretion how far the debtors' 
estates shall be consolidated. 
34 See note 6 and the accompanying text supra. 
35 Rule 401, applicable in liquidaifon cases, operates as a stay only of actions against the 
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The automatic stay operates in the same way against all entities, 
including governmental units, except as provided in section 362(b). 
The exception is a substantial limitation. A governmental unit is 
explicitly protected against the stay by two paragraphs of subsec-
tion (b) that apply when the unit is suing to enforce the unit's police 
or regulatory power. Clearly, the purpose of these paragraphs is to 
overrule decisions applying the automatic stay to proceedings to 
enforce state environmental control laws.36 On the other hand, the 
statutory stay is explicitly made applicable to an administrative 
proceeding by section 362(a)(l).37 This paragraph resolves a con-
flict among opinions construing the automatic stay rules in debtor 
rehabilitation cases.38 
There are eight paragraphs of section 362(a) setting forth the 
kinds of matters subject to the statutory stay. The stay operates 
against 
(1) a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the 
debtor, including the issuance or employment of process; 
(2) the enforcement of a judgment against the debtor or the 
property of the estate; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of or from the es-
tate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property 
of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against the debt-
or's property securing a prepetition debt; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a prepetition claim 
against the debtor; 
(7) setoff of any prepetition debt owing to the debtor against any 
claim of the debtor; and 
bankrupt on provable claims. The automatic stays applicable under the chapter rules, on the 
other hand, operate generally to bar proceedings against the debtor without regard to the 
provability of the claims on which the proceedings are based. The automatic stay of§ 362 of 
Title 11 operates, in liquidation and rehabilitation cases alike, against proceedings on claims 
against the debtor irrespective of their provability. A case illu~trative of the difference in the 
scope of the stay under the rules and under the statute is Moshier v. Brown, 4 Bankr. Ct. 
Dec. 119 (Ref., N .D. Cal. 1978). There the automatic stay of Rule 401 was dissolved (and 
should have been held inoperative) as against an action for assault and battery pending at the 
time of the alleged tortfeasor's bankruptcy because the underlying claim was not provable. 
Under Title II, as under the chapter stay rules, the nonprovability of the underlying claim 
would be irrelevant to the operation of the automatic stay. 
36 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 207 n.162 and notes 110-11 infra. 
37 II U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(I) (West Supp. 1979). The House Report explains: "All proceed-
ings are stayed, including arbitration, license revocation, administrative, and judicial pro-
ceedings. Proceedings in this sense encompasses civil actions as well, and all proceedings 
even if they are not before governmental tribunals." HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 340. 
Insofar as the reference to "civil actions as well" suggests that criminal proceedings may be 
stayed, the implication is explicitly negated in§ 362(b)(I), discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 102-03 infra. 
38 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 209 n.172. 
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(8) a proceeding by the debtor before the United States Tax 
Court. 
I. Proceeding Against the Debtor on Pre petition Cause of 
Action-Like the automatic stay rules, the statutory stay of section 
362(a)(l) bars the continuation of any pending proceeding as well 
as the commencement of a postpetition proceeding against the 
debtor.39 The statute limits applicability of the stay to a proceeding 
that could have been commenced, or that seeks recovery on a 
claim that arose, before the filing of the petition. Thus, unlike the 
chapter stay rules,40 section 362 does not affect an action brought 
against a debtor on a postpetition claim or any proceeding involv-
ing pos tpetition transactions or conduct of the debtor. 41 · 
A premise of the automatic stay rules applicable in chapter cases 
is that any proceeding against the debtor is potentially injurious to 
the effort to reorganize or rehabilitate the debtor, irrespective of 
the nature of the claim or cause underlying the proceeding. If the 
proceeding involves postpetition matters that cannot be dealt with 
in the plan, the court may grant relief from the stay. The premise of 
the statutory stay, on the other hand, is that a proceeding against 
the debtor based on a postpetition claim or cause is so unlikely to 
interfere with the successful conduct and completion of a case 
pending under Title 11 that it should not be automatically stayed. 
39 Section 362 of Title 11 does not make any particular reference to other cases or proceed-
ings under Title 11, but the broad stay of the commencement of a judicial proceeding against 
a debtor, including the issuance or employment of process, presumably precludes the filing 
of any involuntary petition against the debtor under Title 11. Like the chapter automatic stay 
rules discussed in Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 209 n.159, § 362 also appears to pre-
clude the continuation of any previously initiated case pending under Title 11 or any other 
law, and there is no exception for the continuation of a reorganization or other rehabilitation 
case. The stay section does not purport to restrict the filing of any voluntary petition by a 
debtor by or against whom a petition has previously been filed under Title 11. There is no 
provision in the statute authorizing consolidation or other disposition of competing cases. 
involving the same or a related debtor. The draftsmen have left matters of this nature to be 
dealt with by rules of procedure. See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 294. 
40 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 209 n.159. 
41 The House and Senate Reports do not explain or comment on this restriction on the 
scope of the stay, but it goes well beyond the exeption in the Commission's proposed§ 4-
50J(a)(l)(A) for an action authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1976). The latter provision au-
thorizes a person dealing with a trustee, receiver, or debtor operating a business under the 
Bankruptcy Act, or injured by such operation, to sue in any court of competent jurisdiction 
without the consent of the bankruptcy court. Such a suit would nevertheless be within the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. See 28 U .S.C. § 147l(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 
95-598, § 24l(a), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
The SEC criticized the Commission's proposals for not implementing the policy of the 
Judicial Code to protect access of litigants to state courts or other courts of general jurisdic-
tion. House Hearings, supra note 23, at 2200. The venue provisions of the new legislation, 
however, like those of the Commission's proposal, contain safeguards against imposition of 
an inconvenient forum on litigation coming within 28 U.S.C. § 959(a). See 28 U.S.C. 
§ J473(d) & (e), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
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Therefore, a stay is appropriate only if the debtor's trustee can per-
suade the bankruptcy court to enjoin the other proceeding. 
The limitations on the application of paragraph (1) may raise 
questions as to the operation of the stay against certain actions that 
are now subject to the automatic stay of the Rules. Consider, for 
example, an action by a codebtor entitled to reimbursement or sub-
rogation who has paid a creditor after the filing of the petition 
under Title 11,42 or an action on a note or other obligation of the 
debtor that did not mature or on which there had been no default 
until after the filing of the petition. Since the word "claim" is de-
fined in section 101(4) to include a "contingent" or "unmatured" 
claim, there should be no doubt of the intent to bring these types of 
actions within the sweep of the stay. 
The purpose to reach a nonjudicial proceeding, whether gov-
ernmental or nongovernmental, is made explicit, but a suggestion 
in the House Report43 that license revocation proceedings are 
stayed is hard to reconcile with the limitations previously noted in 
subsection (b). Such a proceeding is a classic example of one "to 
enforce [a] governmental unit's police or regulatory power," and 
there can be little doubt of the congressional intent to overrule con-
trary case law under the rules. 44 
The issuance or employment of process is explicitly made sub-
ject to the statutory stay. Such a step in litigation seems to be 
otherwise covered by the references to "a judicial ... proceed-
ing" and "the enforcement ... of a judgment" in paragraphs (1) 
and (2).45 The House Report ventures a laborious explanation of 
42 A surety's or codebtor's right of reimbursement or subrogation is not enforceable until 
he has paid at least a part of the debt for which he is liable to the creditor. L. SIMPSON, 
SuRETYSHIP § 48 (1950). A similar situation is presented when a negotiable instrument on 
which a debtor is secondarily liable is dishonored by the drawee after the filing of the peti-
tion. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 412,419 (1972). A contin-
gent claim of a surety or an endorser of a negotiable instrument executed by a primary 
debtor _is nonetheless a contingent claim prior to the debtor's default and payment by the 
surety or secondarily liable party. Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273 (1931); J. MCLACHLAN, 
BANKRUPTCY § 139 (1956). 
43 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 340. 
44 See, e.g .. Katman v. New Jersey Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 
524 (Ref., D.N.J. 1977) (the court directed reinstatement of a liquor license cancelled pur-
suant to a proceeding by the Municipal Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control of Camden, 
N.J., during the pendency of the bankruptcy case of the licensee). But see In re Colonial 
Tavern, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976) (the court declined to apply the stay of Rule 
11-44 to a proceeding to suspend a liquor license). See notes 111 & 112 and the accompanying 
text infra; Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 202 & n.143, 207 & n.162, 209 & nn.172-73. 
45 But cf. Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191, 203 (S.D.N. Y. 1974), 
where a general stay of all proceedings against the debtor entered by a bankruptcy judge 
pursuant to § 314 of the Bankruptcy Act was held not to forbid compulsory production of 
documents by the debtor's officers. The production of the documents was sought in litiga-
tion instituted against a Chapter XI debtor and its officers and directors to recover damages 
for fraudulent misrepresentations, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion, alleged to have 
occurred in connection with a subcontract entered into by the plaintiff with the debtor as a 
government contractor. The court concluded that compulsory production of the documents 
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the reference to the issuance of process, stating that the provision 
is designed "to prevent the issuance of a writ of execution by a 
judgment creditor of the debtor to obtain property that was prop-
erty of the debtor before the case, but that was transferred, subject 
to the judgment lien, before the case." 46 Enforcement of the judg-
ment lien against the transferred property is said not to be prohib-
ited by the other paragraphs of section 362(a), because they pro-
hibit only the pursuit of property of the debtor or of the estate. Ar-
guably, however, paragraphs (1), (2), and (6) stay the enforcement 
of a judgment against the debtor by the issuance or employment of 
any process or by any act, without regard to whose property is af-
fected. It is not apparent why special language was designed for the 
case put in the House Report explanation, since the fact situation 
presented appears to be one appropriate for the grant of relief from 
the stay to permit enforcement of the lien against the transferred 
property. In any event, the situation arises too infrequently to re-
qui re any special provision for it in the statute. 
2. Enforcement of Prepetition Judgment-The statutory stay of 
paragraph (2) is directed against the enforcement of only a pre-
petition judgment, whereas the automatic stay rules generally op-
erate against the enforcement of a judgment whether obtained be-
fore or after the filing of the petition.47 Insofar as the stays apply to 
judgments on causes of action existing prior to the filing of a peti-
tion against the debtor, it is unlikely that any different result was 
intended or will be found by the courts to follow from the statutory 
limitation of the stay to enforcement of prepetition judgments. A 
postpetition judgment would be the result of the continuation of a 
judicial proceeding in violation of the statutory stay48 _and therefore 
could not be effective or enforceable against the debtor or the 
would not defeat the purpose of the stay to "prevent intelference with, or diminution of, the 
debtor's property during the pendency of the Chapter XI proceeding." Id. at 203. While re-
lief from the stay insofar as it intelfered with the prosecution of the action against the offi-
cers might well have been appropriate, the court took too restrictive a view of the scope of 
the stay entered by the bankruptcy judge. 
46 HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 341. The House Report suggests that in the supposed 
case the judgment creditor is allowed to proceed by foreclosure against the property but not 
by a general writ of execution. Foreclosure is not the usual method of enforcing a judgment 
lien. l G.GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 17c (rev. ed. 1940); s. 
RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTEC-
TION 103 n.5 (2d ed. 1975). Presumably the Report is suggesting that, in states authorizing 
foreclosure of judgment liens, the judgment creditor may avoid the necessity of obtaining 
relief from the stay by commencing a foreclosure action solely against the transferee without 
seeking a personal judgment against him. It might be simpler to obtain relieffrom the stay. 
47 See subdivision (a) of each of Rules 401, 8-501, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43, and 13-401. 
•• A judicial proceeding resulting in a postpetition judgment on a prepetition cause of ac-
tion might be commenced against the debtor before or after the filing of the petition. It is 
immaterial under the Rules and it should be immaterial under the statute when the action 
was commenced if the judgment is entered during the pendency of the case. 
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property of the estate without the consent or permission of the 
bankruptcy court. 49 
The reference to property of the estate in paragraphs (2), (3), (4), 
and (5) of section 362 requires examination of section 541, which 
defines the term. The property of the estate is intended to be more 
comprehensive than the property to which the trustee takes title 
under section 70 of the prior law .50 In particular, the new term is 
intended to free the courts of the necessity of consulting the law of 
a state respecting the transferability or leviability of a particular as-
set. 51 With respect to certain kinds of property, the new estate is 
larger than that to which the trustee now has title. A notable exam-
ple is the undivided interest of the debtor in a tenancy by the en-
tirety, which may be unavailable to the trustee under the prior 
law .52 The new statute also resolves doubts arising under the prior 
law as to the nature and extent of the interest of the trustee of a 
partnership in the property of the general partners. A provision of 
the statute recognizes as property of the estate only the trustee's 
right of recovery for a deficiency in the partnership estate to pay 
claims against it.53 No provision speaks to the nature of a partner's 
interest in the partnership property. 54 
3. Dispossession of Property of or from the Estate-Section 
362(a)(3) of Title 11 protects property of the estate from any act that 
would deprive the debtor or trustee of possession. The word "act" 
is presumably used here as elsewhere in subsection (a) to include 
judicial and nonjudicial actions. The statutory stay also operates 
against any party's effort to obtain possession of property of the 
estate from any other person, and that literally appears to preclude 
any act by the debtor or trustee to obtain property of the estate 
from any adverse claimant, whether rightfully or wrongfully in 
possession. Stultifying constructions of the language will presuma-
bly be avoided by the courts by looking to the purpose to protect 
the estate. The stay also purports to operate against any act to ob-
tain possession of "property from the estate. " 55 This language is 
49 Cf. Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 258 & n.413. 
50 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 367-69; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 82-84. 
51 In this respect the new law follows the recommendations of the Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Laws. COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 147-52. These recommendations in 
tum followed proposals by Professor Countryman in Countryman, The Use of State Law in 
Bankruptcy Cases (pt. I), 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 407 (1972). 
•• The trustee may realize on this expansion of the estate to include an undivided interest 
in the entirety, however, only when the debtor opts for the federal package of exemptions 
provided by § 522 of the new law. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 363(h)-(i), 522(b)(2)(B), 54I(a)(I) 
(West Supp. 1979). 
• 3 See 11 U .S.C.A. §§ 541(a)(3), 723 (West Supp. 1979). Compare prior law as discussed in 
Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 213 nn.198-2O2. 
•• See also Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 212-13 & nn.192-97. 
•• A cryptic explanation of§ 362(a)(3) in the House REPORT, supra note 14, at 341, 
suggests that "property of the estate" is "property of the debtor as of the date of the filing of 
16 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:1 
perhaps included to forestall a lienor or other adverse claimant 
from asserting as a justification for an exercise of self-help that the 
property taken from the debtor did not belong to the estate.56 
The statutory stay is broader than the automatic stay provided 
by any of the rules insofar as it extends to an act to obtain posses-
sion for a purpose other than the enforcement of a lien. The reason 
for trying to get possession is immaterial under section 362(a)(3). It 
is a well established principle of bankruptcy law that property in 
the possession of a debtor at the time of the filing of a petition by or 
against him is in the custody of the bankruptcy court,57 and any act 
that would tend to interfere with the availability of the property for 
the purposes of administration of the estate would be at least po-
tentially contemptuous.58 All of the debtor rehabilitation chapters 
of the Bankruptcy Act contain sections vesting the bankruptcy 
court with exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his property 
from the filing of the petition,59 but no statutory provision purports 
to confer comparable jurisdiction or custody on the bankruptcy 
the petition", whereas "property from the estate" is "property over which the estate has 
control or possession." 
06 A possible illustration is afforded by Hudson v. Genessee Mchts. Bank & Trust Co. (In 
re Hudson), 17 Collier Bankr. Cas. 255 (Ref., E.D. Mich. 1978), where the court ruled that 
the automatic stay of Rule 13-401 operated to prevent the imminent expiration of the period 
allowed for redemption of property from foreclosure of a mortgage. The ruling is a question-
able construction of the rule, which does not operate against the running of periods oflimita-
tion, and arguably the ruling would be no more justifiable as a construction of§ 362. The 
trustee or debtor might argue, however, that the stay prescribed by § 362(a)(3) operates to 
prevent the purchaser at the foreclosure sale from "any act to obtain possession of ... 
property from the estate." 
Another suggestive case in this connection is Schwartz v. A.J. Armstrong Co., 179 F.2d 
766 (2d Cir. 1950), allowing the trustee in bankruptcy of a bulk vendee to avoid, under§ 67a 
of the Bankruptcy Act, an execution lien obtained by a creditor of the bulk seller against 
assets transferred to the bankrupt in violation of the New York Bulk Sales law. The execu-
tion lienor in such a situation would appear to be subject to the stay prescribed by 
§ 362(a)(3). The decision was criticized as in conflict with the premises of both the New 
York Bulk Sales law and the Bankruptcy Act. Weintraub & Levin, Bulk Sales Law and 
Adequate Protection of Creditors, 65 HARV. L. REv. 418, 429-32 (1952); 28 TEXAS L. REv. 
989 (1950). Unlike § 67a of the Bankruptcy Act, § 547 of the newly enacted Title 11. enables 
the trustee to avoid a preferential lien only if obtained by a "creditor." The execution credi-
tor of the bulk seller in the Schwartz case was also a creditor of the bankrupt bulk transferee 
by virtue of an assumption of the seller's liabilities, but the execution lien had not been ob-
tained in pursuit of any remedy against the transferee or its property. · 
07 See Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganization 
and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW. 15, 29 (1974); see also Automatic Stay I, supra 
note 3, at 187 & n.57, 203 & n.147. 
08 See, e.g., In re Iron Clad Mfg. Co., 193 F. 781,784 (E.D.N.Y. 1912)(property of bank-
rupt corporation removed, concealed, or not accounted for by officers or employees of the 
bankrupt said to be a contempt in defiance of the jurisdiction given the court by the filing of 
the petition). See also Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 261 & n.425. 
Neither paragraph (3) nor any other paragraph of§ 362(a), however, supports an argument 
made during Senate Committee Hearings on S. 2266 that the automatic stay would operate 
to prevent a landlord of a debtor who has abandoned leased premises from trying to find 
another tenant. The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 728 (1977). 
09 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 189 n.65. 
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court in a straight bankruptcy case. The law that has elaborated the 
notion of the custody of the bankruptcy court in straight bank-
ruptcy is thus a product of judicial interpretation and imagination. 
The new law vests exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor's property, 
wherever located, in the bankruptcy court in which the debtor's 
case is pending, without any differentiation based on the chapter 
that applies to the case. 60 Section 362(a)(3) of Title 11 provides an 
additional statutory base for a concept of custody of the property 
of the estate regardless of who has possession of it or where it is 
located. 
4. Creation, Perfection, or Enforcement of a Lien-In its opera-
tion against any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against 
property of the estate, the statutory stay prescribed by section 
362(a)(4) of Title 11 goes beyond the literal import of the automatic 
stays imposed by the Rules against lien enforcement. Arguably an 
act taken to create or perfect a lien is a step toward its eventual 
enforcement and is therefore barred by the Rules that are directed 
against lien enforcement. The case law construing the Rules on this 
point is tentative,61 and the new statute provides some clarifica-
tion. 62 Paragraph (3) of subsection (b) nullifies the operation of the 
stay against postpetition perfection, however, when perfection 
would be effective against the trustee under section 546(b). 63 Sec-
tion 546(b) permits perfection to be effective against the trustee 
80 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e). An amendment has been proposed to this provision to extend the 
court's exclusive jurisdiction to all property of the estate wherever located. S. 6538, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 211(b) (1979). The amendment would clarify the original purpose and in-
tent of the subsectjon. 
81 A recent authoritative ruling in Marietta Baptist Tabernacle, Inc. v. Tomberlin Assoc., 
Architects, Inc., 576 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1978), held that a postpetition filing of notice to per-
fect a statutory architect's lien pursuant to GA.CODE ANN. § 67-2002 (Cum. Supp. 1978) did 
not violate the automatic stay resulting from the filing of a Chapter XI petition by the owner 
of the property subject to the lien. The filing of notice was then held to validate the lien 
against the trustee because timely perfection was deemed to relate back as against judgment 
lien creditors under Georgia law. 576 F.2d at 1240. The bankruptcy judge had reached a dif-
ferent conclusion as to the nature and effect of the act of perfection. See Automatic Stay I, 
supra note 3, at 203 n.148, 204 n.150, 211 nn.186-87. 
82 The House and Senate Reports refer only to the impact of the stay on lien creation, lien 
perfection by the taking of possession, and lien enforcement by obtaining court process. 
HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 341; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 50. Clearly, the 
stay also operates against perfection by notice-filing and recordation. The Reports added 
that "[t]o permit lien creation after bankruptcy would give certain creditors preferential 
treatment." Id. The need for and effect of§ 362(a)(4) are somewhat overstated, however, 
insofar as the Report intimates that the stay prevents preferences. Postpetition creation, per-
fection, and enforcement of liens are generally ineffective to give creditors preferential 
treatment because of the operation of§ 546(b) and the avoidance sections,§§ 544 and 547. 
The stay deters efforts of creditors to improve their position vis-a-vis the trustee after the 
filing of the petition and thus may reduce confusion and litigation that would otherwise result 
from such efforts. 
83 Thus the result reached in Marietta Baptist Tabernacle v. Tomberlin Assoc., Architects, 
-Inc., 576 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1978), discussed in note 61 supra, would not be changed by § 
362. Subsection (b)(3) is discussed in Part B2(c) infra. 
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under sections 544,64 545,65 and 54966 whenever such perfection 
would be effective under generally applicable law "against an en-
tity that acquires rights in such property before the date of such 
perfection. " 67 If such perfection requires seizure or the com-
mencement of an action to be effective, timely notice is prescribed 
as the mode of accomplishing the perfection after the filing of the 
petition.68 The stay against perfection thus appears to operate only 
when perfection would be ineffective or pointless anyway .69 The 
prohibition on postpetition perfection is apparently intended to 
deter efforts of creditors to improve their position vis-a-vis the 
trustee after the filing of the petition. 70 Unless an act of postpeti-
tion perfection cannot conceivably operate to improve the position 
of the holder of an adverse interest vis-a-vis the trustee, the ad-
verse claimant will undertake to perfect. 71 A "lien" is defined 
broadly in section 101 to mean a "charge against or interest in 
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obliga-
64 Section 544(a) enables the trustee to succeed to the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor, 
a hypothetical creditor with an execution return unsatisfied, and a hypothetical bona fide 
purchaser of real property as of the date of the filing of the petition. Section 544(b) gives the 
trustee the right to avoid any transfer or obligation that could have been avoided by an unse-
cured creditor. Section 544(a) is an extension of the rights and powers of a trustee under 
§ 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, and § 544(b) is a codification of the rights of the trustee under 
§ 70e of the Bankruptcy Act. 
65 Section 545 authorizes the trustee to avoid certain statutory liens and corresponds to 
§ 67c(l) of the Bankruptcy Act. 
66 Section 549 enables the trustee to avoid postpetition transfers and corresponds to§§ 21g 
and 70d of the Bankruptcy Act. 
67 It seems anomalous to allow a postpetition act of perfection to defeat the trustee if the 
same act of perfection accomplished before the petition would not have been effective 
against the trustee, but§ 546(b) is susceptible of a reading that leads to that result. Thus, 
suppose that a statutory lien could be perfected so as to be effective against a prior judicial 
lien creditor but not against a prior bona fide purchaser. Section 546(b) appears to make the 
belatedly perfected statutory lien effective against the trustee, even though the trustee could 
have prevailed against the adverse interest if the act of perfection had occurred prior to the 
filing of the petition. 
68 To whom or how notice should be given is not indicated in § 546(b). Presumably this is 
one of the matters to be dealt with by the Rules. 
69 The stay thus appears not to operate against the filing of a financing statement within 
ten days of the delivery of collateral subject to a purchase-money security interest under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, since filing within the JO-day period is effective 
as against a lien creditor whose rights arise before the filing. See U .C.C. § 9-301(2). If the 
security interest in such a case is not of the purchase-money variety, perfection does not 
relate back under the Code or § 546(b), and, accordingly, the stay operates against such 
tardy perfection. A transfer may be deemed perfected by operation of law under 
§ 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) for the purposes of the preference section if a petition is filed against a 
transferor within ten days after the transfer. The operation of the stay against any act to 
perfect in such a situation is thus of no consequence. 
70 See note 62 supra. 
71 If the act of perfection requires the taking of possession or the commencement of an 
action, the automatic stay of§ 362(a) operates to preclude the taking of either of those steps 
but does not proscribe the substitute act of "notice" unless the notice has no retroactive 
force whatsoever under "generally applicable law.'' The risk of suffering the imposition of 
any sanction for mistakenly trying to perfect a lien pursuant to§ 546(b) does not appear to be 
a serious one. 
FALL 1978) Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy 19 
tion. " 72 The definition is consistent with the meaning given the 
term as used in the automatic stay rules, 73 and section 362(a){4) is 
consistent with the automatic stay rules for debtor relief insofar as 
lien enforcement is concerned. Neither the statutory language nor 
the Rules definitively answer the question whether the stay oper-
ates against postpetition receipt of rents and payments on account 
by a secured creditor or its agent pursuant to a prepetition ar-
rangement that requires no affirmative act on the part of the credi-
tor. 74 
Under paragraph (5) of section 362(a), the automatic stay of the 
statute operates against the creation, perfection, or enforcement of 
a lien against the debtor's property insofar as it secures a prepeti-
tion debt. The critical difference between this paragraph and the 
preceding one is that this paragraph protects the debtor's interest 
in exempt property and property that never comes into the estate. 
The provision, along with two new sections, rejects the premise of 
Lockwood v. Exchange Bank75 that the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court does not extend to property that is set apart as 
exempt. 76 The stay does not, however, interfere with the enforce-
ment of any lien against the debtor's property if the lienor is seek-
ing enforcement of a postpetition debt. 
72 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(28) (West Supp. 1979). The term includes a judicial lien, a statutory 
lien, a common-law lien, and a security interest. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 312; SE.N-
ATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 25. The varieties ofliens other than the common-law lien are 
also defined in § IOI of Title 11. 
73 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 203 & n.145. 
74 Cf. Caribbean Food Products, Inc. v. Banco Credito y Ahoi-ro Ponceno, 575 F.2d 961 
(1st Cir. 1978) (upholding stay against collection of accounts receivable after the filing of a 
Chapter XI petition by the assignor, where secured creditor had written obligors on ac-
counts after the filing); Flintridge Station Assoc. v. American Fletcher Mortgage Co., 438 F. 
Supp. 410 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (whether Rule 12-43 stays collection of assigned rents by mort-
gagee pursuant to a prepetition agreement held to require a hearing in an adversary proceed-
ing); In re DeWitt, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 66,194 (Ref., M.D. 
Fla. 1976) (postpetition receipt of wages by creditor pursuant to debtor's authorization held 
not violative of automatic stay of Rule 601, wages being after-acquired property not belong-
ing to the debtor's estate). _ _ . 
Eli Silberfeld, General Counsel for the National Commercial Finance Conference, tes-
tified at the House Hearings that although existing law does not prevent a purchaser of ac-
counts from collecting the accounts after the filing of a petition, the Commission's proposed 
§ 4-501 needed to be clarified to enable a purchaser or assignee for security to collect ac-
counts free from restraint by an automatic stay. House Hearings, supra note 23, at 1811, 
1826. Leon Forman, testifying on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference, took the 
position that the Commission's proposal would not change the law and expressed doubt that 
present law interferes with collection of accounts by factors who purchase accounts, assume 
the credit risks, notify debtors on the accounts, and routinely collect from the debtors. Id. at 
1829. The language of the automatic stay Rules, the Commission's proposed § 4-501, and 
§ 362 cannot be distinguished insofar as the effect of the stay on collection of assigned ac-
counts is concerned, and the House and Senate Reports do not discuss the question. 
75 190 U.S. ·294 (1903). 
76 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 368; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 82. The 
other sections of the new law implementing the demise of the doctrine of Lockwood v. Ex-
change Bank are 11 U .S.C.A. § 541(a)(I) (West Supp. 1979) and 28 U .S.C.A. § 147 l(b) (West 
Supp. 1979). 
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The House. Report indicates that paragraph (5), in operating 
against the creation, perfection, or enforcement of a lien against 
property of the debtor, protects "most property that is acquired 
after the date of the filing of the petition, property that is exempted, 
or property that does not pass to the estate." 77 A provision in sec-
tion 362(c)(l) prescribing the duration of the stay of an act against 
property of the estate obviously does not apply to a stay of an act 
against property of the debtor. 78 "Property of the estate," how-
ever, includes all the debtor's property as of the commencement of 
the case,79 since the debtor can exempt only from "property of the 
estate,"80 and since the property claimed as exempt on the debt-
or's list "is exempt. " 81 It is not clear when the stay provided by 
paragraph (5) becomes effective with respect to exempt property .82 
Since the scope and operation of the stay with respect to liens 
against property of the estate and of the debtor are in most respects 
identical, however, the question is not likely to become critical. A 
difference between the stays provided by paragraphs (4) and (5) is 
that the latter paragraph applies only with respect to liens securing 
prepetition claims. This limitation is necessary to keep the stay 
from operating against the creation, perfection, and enforcement of 
liens securing debts that are collectible without restriction by the 
bankruptcy laws. The fresh start policy contemplates that the 
debtor should be free to incur new debt, both secured and unse-
cured. 
The House Report suggested that the stay of paragraph (5), like 
that prescribed by paragraph (4), prevents creditors from receiving 
preferential treatment.83 Insofar as the paragraph succeeds in pre-
venting prepetition creditors from obtaining priority with respect to 
property not belonging to the estate, it serves a questionable objec-
tive.84 A sounder justification for paragraph (5) is that it protects 
the debtor in the enjoyment of his discharge. 85 
77 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 341. 
78 See notes 153-58 infra. 
79 11 U .S.C.A. § 54l(a)(I) (West Supp. 1979). 
80 Id. § 522(b). 
81 Id. § 522(1). 
82 See also the discussion in the text accompanying notes 153-58 infra. 
83 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 341. 
84 It seems ill advised for the law to handicap a prepetition creditor with a nondischarge-
able claim in a competition with postpetition creditors where both are pursuing property of 
the debtor that is not property of the estate. It is hardly more appropriate for the law to 
restrain competition for priority among prepetition creditors with nondischargeable claims 
with respect to such property. 
85 Circumvention of the discharge is acknowledged to be one of the purposes of the stay. 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 341. 
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Some but not all liens against exempt property are voidable by 
the debtor under section 522.86 The stay operates generally against 
(he creation, perfection, and enforcement of liens, whether or not 
voidable, on the debtor's property until the debtor's discharge is 
granted or denied or the case is closed or dismissed.87 As previ-
ously noted, however, the stay of postpetition perfection is subject 
to the limitation in subsection (b)(3) that the stay is inoperative if 
the perfection relates back against intervening rights under non-
bankruptcy law .88 Both section 362(b)(3) and section 546(b), to 
which the former section refers, speak only of the effect of perfec-
tion on the trustee's rights. The debtor's right to avoid a lien for 
belated perfection, however, cannot exceed that of the trustee. In-
deed, it will often be considerably less because no right of 
avoidance of any voluntary transfer of exempt property is given the 
debtor under section 522, except with respect to nonpossessory 
nonpurchase-money security interests in certain kinds of personal-
ty .89 These latter interests in exempt personalty are voidable by the 
debtor without regard to their being perfected and without regard 
to their validity as against the trustee. In sum, the stay of perfec-
tion of liens provided by section 362(a)(5) is not likely to be of 
much utility to the debtor. 
5. Collection of Prepetition Claims-The sixth paragraph of sec-
tion 362(a), staying any act to collect, assess, or recover a prepeti-
tion claim against the debtor, overlaps substantially the first para-
graph of the subsection.90 The first paragraph stays only a judicial, 
administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor, whereas the 
sixth paragraph extends to activity that may not be connected in 
any way with such a proceeding. Since the fourth and fifth para-
graphs of section 362(a) deal explicitly with enforcement of liens, 
and the third paragraph deals with the taking of possession, a rem-
edy generally available only to secured creditors, it is inferable 
that the sixth paragraph of the subsection is directed primarily to 
activities of unsecured creditors. The House Report confirms that 
the objective of the provision is to prevent evasion of the bank-
86 11 U .S.C.A. § 522(0,(h) (West Supp. 1979). 
87 Id. § 362(c)(2). 
88 See the text accompanying note 63 supra. 
89 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(2) (West Supp. 1979). 
90 It should be noted that both paragraphs (I) and (6), along with the other paragraphs of 
subsection (a), are subject to the exceptions of subsection (b), which excludes from the op-
eration of the stay certain proceedings and acts to collect prepetition claims. 
The word "assess" was added at a very late stage in the legislative process, and its pur-
pose and effect are not explained in the legislative report. The manifest intention is to stay 
tax collectors from taking any step in the direction of enforcing unsecured tax claims against 
the debtor. 
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ruptcy laws' purpose, which is to afford consumer debtors, particu-
larly those who are "[i]nexperienced, frightened, or ill-
counseled," a fresh start free of the load of prepetition debt.91 The 
result is consistent with a questionable decision under the automa-
tic stay rules which imposed liability for counsel's fees on a credi-
tor who tried to collect a dischargeable debt by persistent calls and 
communications during the pendency of its debtor's bankruptcy 
case.92 Although the new provision overrules the numerous cases 
that decline to interfere with nonjudicial efforts to collect debts,93 it 
probably does not go so far as to create a right of action for dam-
ages against a creditor for resorting to coercive collection 
techniques against a debtor. 94 
Section 505(c) of Title 11 contains a qualification of section 
362(a)(6). Section 505, which is derived from, but is a considerable 
elaboration of, section 2a(2A) of the Bankruptcy Act, vests juris-
diction in the bankruptcy court to determine the amount or legality 
of any tax, fine or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to a tax, 
subject to certain limitations prescribed by the section. After de-
termination by the bankruptcy court of a tax under section 505, the 
governmental unit charged with responsibility for its collection 
may assess the tax against the estate, the debtor, or a successor to 
the debtor. If the assessment of a tax determined under section 505 
should operate prejudicially with respect to the administration of 
the estate or undercut the fresh start policy of the bankruptcy laws, 
the injunctive power of the bankruptcy court presumably can be 
invoked by the trustee or the debtor. 95 
6. Setoff-The seventh paragraph of section 362(a) stays setoff of 
a prepetition debt owed to the debtor against a claim against the 
debtor. This makes a feature now found only in Rules 8-501 and 
9-496 generally operative in all cases under Title 11. This provision 
91 HOUSE REPORT' supra note 14, at 342. See also SENATE REPORT' supra note 14, at 54. 
92 In re Gann, l Bankr. Ct. Dec. 154 (Ref., E.D. Tenn. 1974), cited in Automatic Stay I, 
supra note 3, at 201 n. 138. Cf. In re Ryan Co., 16 Collier Bankr. Cas. 492, 496 (Ref., D. Conn. 
1978), where Bankruptcy Judge Seidman enjoined a union from calling a strike against a 
Chapter XI debtor in possession for the purpose of coercing the payment of arrearages to a 
pension and welfare fund. After noting that "the threatened strike [was] not related to a 
'labor dispute' which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations 
Act," Judge Seidman observed that the threatened strike was "an effort to obtain by impro-
per means what it [the union] is restrained from doing by operation of law, to wit, the provi-
sions of Rule ll-44(a)." 
93 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 202 n.139. 
94 A debtor apparently asserted such a ground of liability unsuccessfully under Rules 401 
and 601 in In re Sather, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,I 66,508 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977). Cf. In re 
Shaffer, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,I 66,511 (Ref., W.D. Mich. 1977) (Rule 401 held to afford no 
basis for enabling the bankruptcy court to determine whether threatened dismissal of debtor 
by his employer was wrongful). 
95 See l l U .S.C.A. § 105(a) (West Supp. 1979). 
96 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 214 & nn.203-07. 
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does not purport to affect the right of an obligee of the debtor or the 
trustee to setoff a postpetition debt against any kind of claim 
against the debtor; in any event, the possibility of the assertion of 
such a setoff is quite unlikely. It does not matter under the statute 
as passed whether the obligee of the debtor has a postpetition or 
prepetition claim against the debtor. Setoff is stayed in either case, 
however, only if the obligee's debt to the debtor arose before the 
petition was filed. It is to be emphasized that section 362 does not 
govern the question whether setoff ultimately will be allowed be-
fore final distribution is ordered or a plan is confirmed. The stay 
simply prevents the exercise of the right of setoff at the outset of 
the case until the merits of the creditor's claim against the debtor 
can be determined in due course during the administration of the 
case. 
7. Proceeding Before the United States Tax Court-The man-
agers of the bankruptcy bills added to section 362(a) an eighth 
category of proceedings subject to the stay, namely, ''a proceeding 
before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." This 
additional role for the automatic stay was recommended by Wil-
liam T. Plumb. 97 Section 6871 of the Internal Revenue Code itself 
forbids the filing of a petition for redetermination with the Tax 
Court during the pend ency of a case concerning the taxpayer under 
the bankruptcy laws.98 If a proceeding for the determination of a 
deficiency is pending in the Tax Court when the taxpayer files a 
petition under the bankruptcy laws, section 6871 contemplates that 
an assessment of deficiency shall be made promptly and a claim 
presented in due course to the bankruptcy court.99 The bankruptcy 
court and the Tax Court have had concurrentjurisdiction to deter-
mine the claim in this situation. Mr. Plumb argued persuasively 
that the Tax Court ordinarily, in the interest of judicial economy 
and the avoidance of unnecessary expense to the distressed tax-
97 Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws: Tax 
Procedures, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1360, 1399-1422 (1975); The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on 
the Judic(ary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 847-48 (1975); House Hearings, supra note 23, at 
2075-77 (1976). Mr. Plumb, a member of the Washington, D.C. bar, was a consultant to the 
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. His Reports on Federal Income Tax 
Returns and Liabilities in Bankruptcy and Loss Carryovers and Debt Reduction in the Pro-
ceedings Under Chapters X, XI, and XII were published in Part III of the Commission's 
Report. 
98 I.R.C. § 6871(b) prohibits the filing of any petition for redetermination of the Tax Court 
"after the adjudication of bankruptcy, the filing or (where approval is required by the Bank-
ruptcy Act) the approval of a petition of, or the approval of a petition against, any taxpayer 
in any other bankruptcy proceeding, or the appointment of the receiver." It will be neces-
sary in due course to coordinate the language of that subdivision with that of the new Title 
11. 
99 The deficiency assessment is made without notice and hearing in order to enable the 
Revenue Service to file its tax claim in the bankruptcy court. 
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payer, should suspend action on a pending case until the bank-
ruptcy court has passed on the claim. 100 Moreover, injustice may 
be done if the Tax Court sets the case for trial and thereafter dis-. 
misses the case for lack of prosecution when the taxpayer, having 
no funds to litigate the matter in the Tax Court or having assumed 
that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter, 
fails to make an appearance. 101 The Tax Court's dismissal is then 
conclusive of the amount of the deficiency proposed by the com-
missioner or adjusted by the Tax Court. 102 The automatic stay 
provided by section 362(a)(8) eliminates the uncertainty, confu-
sion, and potential injustice that may accrue to the debtor who has 
filed a petition in the Tax Court prior to the filing of a petition con-
cerning the debtor under Title 11. If the litigation in the Tax Court 
has proceeded to an advanced stage or if there is other good reason 
for permitting the litigation to·continue there, relief may be granted 
to permit the Tax Court to continue. 
B. Limitations on the Stay: Section 362(b) 
Section 362(b) of Title 11 contains eight explicit limitations on the 
operation of the stay provided for in subsection (a). Arguably, 
some of these restrictions are implicit under the prior law; but only 
one, relating to the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support, 
has a clear counterpart in any of the automatic stay rules. 
1. Criminal Actions and Proceedings-The first limitation in sec-
tion 362(b) excludes applicability of the stay to "a criminal action 
or proceeding against the debtor." Although Rule 401 purports to 
stay only an action or the enforcement of a judgment if founded on 
a debt, a district court has read the rule to reach a criminal proceed-
ing where the court perceived its purpose to be to collect a dis-
chargeable debt.103 Insofar as section 362(b)(l) precludes from the 
100 Plumb, supra note 'J7, at 1402-03. 
101 Such an injustice is illustrated by Monjar v. Higgins, 132 F.2d 9')() (2d Cir. 1943), where 
a bankrupt taxpayer suffered a dismissal of his case pending in the Board of Tax Appeals 
(the predecessor of the Tax Court) because he failed to appear. The bankruptcy case was a 
nominal asset case, and although the government filed a claim, no objection was filed and no 
determination regarding liability of the claim was made. The government thereafter recov-
ered the deficiency in its claim from after-acquired property of the debtor, and the tax-
payer's subsequent petition for a refund filed in a United States district court was held to be 
barred by statute. Still later the taxpayer unsuccessfully sought to obtain equitable relief in 
the Tax Court. Relief was held to be unavailable, however, since the petition for review 
came too late under the statute governing procedures in the Tax Court. The Tax Court also 
has been held to lack the power of a court of equity after the lapse of the statutory period to 
grant equitable relief from its judgments. Laskey v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 1027 (1957), 
aff'g per curiam, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956). See also Plumb, supra note 97, at 1403-04. 
10• I.R.C. § 6512(a); Fiorentino v. United States, 226 F.2d 619, 621 (3d Cir. 1955). 
103 In re Penny, 414 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D.N .C. l'J76), cited in Automatic Stay/, supra note 
3, at 196 n.107. The bankrupt was charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced after his filing of 
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The sentence of six months' imprisonment was to be 
suspended on payment of the amount of a check given by the bankrupt and dishonored on 
FALL 1978) Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy 25 
scope of the stay criminal contempt proceedings, it appears to be 
consistent with the approach taken by the courts when a bankrupt 
has sought an injunction against the continuation of such a pro-
ceeding under section 2a(l5) of the Bankruptcy Act. 1 04 
2. Collection of Alimony, Maintenance, or Support-Section 
362(b)(2) of Title 11 excludes from the operation of the statutory 
stay the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from prop-
erty that is not property of the estate. Rule 401(a) excludes from 
the stay the commencement or continuation of any action, or the 
enforcement of any judgment, founded on a debt not dischargeable 
under section 17a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act. Since section 17a(7) 
excepts from discharge provable debts for alimony, maintenance, 
and support of wife or child, there is substantial identity of purpose 
and scope in the exclusions from the stay provided by the statute 
and the rule. Nevertheless, there are noteworthy differences. First, 
the automatic stay provided by the Rules applicable in Chapter XI, 
XII, and XIII cases operates against the commencement or con-
tinuation of any court proceeding, or the enforcement of any judg-
ment, against the debtor, including one founded on a claim for 
alimony, maintenance, or support. In this respect the stay under 
several of the rules is broader than the statutory stay. 
Second, the automatic stay provided by the Rules applicable in 
Chapter XI, XII, and XIII cases bars the enforcement of any judg-
ment against the debtor and the enforcement of any lien against his 
property. On the other hand, the statutory stay does not keep the 
alimony, maintenance, or support claimant from pursuing property 
that is not property of the estate. Exempt property105 and postpeti-
tion acquisitions by the debtor may thus be reached by such a 
claimant under the statute without violating the stay. 
presentation for payment before the bankruptcy. The court entered a permanent injunction 
against officials of the state of North Carolina and the courts of a county in that state from 
"bringing, or continuing, criminal proceedings or execution thereon" on account of the dis-
honor of the bad check unless the debt was ultimately not discharged. The word ''action'' is 
apparently used in the Federal Rules of Procedure only with reference to civil proceedings, 
but the court in Penny referred to criminal action and criminal proceedings indiscriminately. 
Compare In re Convenient Food Mart, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 389 (Ref., E.D. Ark. 1977) (a tem-
porary injunction against a criminal prosecution of a debtor for alleged violation of a state 
"hot check" Jaw was set aside on the ground that the debtor's rights could be vindicated in 
the state court). 
••• See In re Koronsky, 170 F. 719 (2d Cir. 1909). See also Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, 
at 250 n.367. 
1 05 Section 522(c) provides that property exempted under the section is not liable during or 
after the close of the case for any prepetition debt for taxes that are not dischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(I) or for alimony, maintenance, or support under § 523(a)(5). This section repre-
sents no change of the law insofar as exempt property remains liable for nondischargeable 
debts for taxes and alimony, maintenance, and support, but the provision for protection of 
exempt property after the closing of the case from the collection of other kinds of nondis-
chargeable claims is a new departure in bankruptcy law. 
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Third, unlike all of the automatic stays of the Rules, the automat-
ic stay of section 362(a) operates against nonjudicial acts to collect 
any prepetition claim, including one for alimony, maintenance, or 
support. Both the Rules and the statute coincide, however, in 
excluding from the stay nonjudicial acts to collect alimony, main-
tenance, or support from property not belonging to the estate. 
Finally, the exclusion by section 362(b)(2), unlike the exclusion 
by Rule 401, of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support 
from the operation of the stay is not in terms limited to the collec-
tion of a nondischargeable claim. The alimony, maintenance, or 
support that is nondischargeable under the proposed law must be 
for and owing to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor. 106 
Similar limitations apply to the alimony, support, or maintenance 
that is nondischargeable under prior law .107 No such limitation 
applies to the alimony, maintenance, or support that may be col-
lected free of the statutory stay; but the trustee or debtor may seek 
an injunction against an attempt to collect dischargeable 
"alimony," "maintenance," or "support" from the debtor. 108 
3. Perfection of Liens and Other Interests-The automatic stay of 
section 362 operates against the perfection of any lien against prop-
erty of the estate109 and any lien against property of the debtor in-
sofar as the lien secures prepetition debt. Paragraph (3) of subsec-
tion (b), however, excepts from the operation of the stay any act of 
perfection that relates back pursuant to section 546(b) as against 
rights that attached to the property before the perfection. An illus-
tration of the intended application of this limitation is the perfec-
10• 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West Supp. 1979). 
1 07 Section 17a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act. This clause refers only to a "wife," and it has 
been held unconstitutional because it creates an arbitrary classification based on sex. 
Schiffman v. Wasserman, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 467 (Ref., D.R.I. 1977) (a bankrupt husband is 
discharged from liability for accrued alimony to his divorced wife); contra, Pinkerton v. Pin-
kerton, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 182 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1978); In re Stephens, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 
,i 66,928 (Ref., W.D. Va. 1978). The general construction of§ 17a(7) treats alimony, support, 
and maintenance as nondischargeable whether owed to a former or present wife. 
1 08 An award of what is denominated alimony, support, or maintenance may be deter-
mined to be a property settlement that constitutes a dischargeable obligation. See, e.g., Cox 
v. Cox, 543 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1976); Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligatwns in 
Divorce: The Support Obligation and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405 
(1975); Loiseaux, Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 41 N.C.L. REv. 27, 31-36 (1962); 
Swann, Dischargeabi/ity of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv. 231, 
237-43 (1976); cf. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 364; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 
79. An award of support may be for the benefit of a person other than a spouse or child of the 
discharged debtor and therefore not protected from discharge. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 262 
F. 574 (N .D.N.Y. 1920) (obligation on bond given to support bankrupt's brother's wife held 
dischargeable). The bankruptcy court would have power to enjoin proceedings and acts not 
covered by the statutory automatic stay, as the court now has power to enjoin proceedings 
and acts not covered by the automatic stays of the Rules. See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, 
at 342. 
10• 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(4),(5} (West Supp. 1979), discussed in the text accompanying 
notes 61-84 supra. 
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tion by notice-filing of a mechanic's lien against real property be-
longing to the estate. By section 362(a)(4) the filing of a petition by 
or against the debtor appears to stay the notice-filing. The automat-
ic stay does not stand in the way of such perfection, however, if 
non bankruptcy law allows the notice-filing to perfect the 
mechanic's lien as against a prior judgment lien against the same 
property. Another illustration is the perfection by notice-filing of a 
purchase-money security interest within the ten-day period al-
lowed by section 9-301(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code. If a 
petition is filed by or against the debtor during the ten-day period 
following delivery to him of the collateral, perfection by notice-
filing ( or otherwise) can be effected without violating the statutory 
stay. The exception to the stay provided by section 362(b)(3) is 
broader than the stay itself to the extent that it purports to allow 
perfection of an interest in property that is not a lien. Moreover, 
the exception refers to an interest in any property, whether belong-
ing to the estate, the debtor, or any other entity. The resulting dis-
crepancies between the scope of the stay and the exception are 
probably inconsequential. 
4. Governmental Enforcement of Police or Regulatory Power-
Paragraphs (4) and (5) of section 362(b) render the automatic stay 
inoperative against any governmental unit enforcing its police or 
regulatory power otherwise than by collecting a money judgment. 
As indicated earlier, 110 these paragraphs overrule several applica-
tions of the automatic stay rules,1 11 but sustain the position taken 
in others.112 As illustrative of actions or proceedings immunized 
from the stay, the House and Senate Reports suggest suits to en-
force laws preventing fraud, protecting the environment, protect-
110 See the text accompanying note 36 supra. 
111 See, e.g., Whalen v. P'arkchester Gen. Hosp., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dee- 292 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 
1978) (hearing by State Commissioner of Health on whether to revoke an operating certifi-
cate of a hospital held subject to stay of Rule 11-44); NLRB v. Adams & Westlake Co., 15 
Collier Bankr. Cas. 20 (Ref., N.D. Ind. 1977) (stay continued against NLRB proceeding on 
charge of unfair labor practices); Katman v. New Jersey Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 13 
Collier Bankr. Cas. 524, 529 (Ref., D.N.J. 1977) ("disciplinary" proceeding against debtor 
before municipal board at which liquor license was cancelled held violative of Rule 401); In 
re Zeitzer Food Corp., 9Collier Bankr. Cas. 614 (Ref., E.D.N.Y. 1976) (administrative pro-
ceeding to revoke debtor's license to resell farm products subject to stay); In re Airport Iron 
& Metal, Inc., 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 281 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1974) (proceeding before NLRB to 
determine whether debtor was successor entity held subject to stay);.·Hillsdale Foundry Co. 
v. Michigan, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec.195 (Ref., W.D. Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney 
General to enforce state's anti-pollution laws held subject to stay of Rule 11-44). The House 
Report referred also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay prevented the state of 
Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was polluting a river in violation of the state's 
environmental protection laws. In addition, it cited an unreported case from Montana where 
a stay prevented Nevada authorities from enforcing their state's anti 0fraud laws protecting 
consumers. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 174-75. 
112 Colonial Tavern v. Byrne, 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976), appeal dismissed as moot 
(license revocation proceeding held not subject to stay of Rule 11-44); Brennan v. T & T 
28 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:1 
ing consumers, and prescribing safety standards. 113 The statutory 
stay would not prohibit injunctive and declaratory relief or even 
the entry of a judgment for damages against the debtor, but a 
money judgment would not be collectible by a governmental unit 
absent permission of the court .11 4 The enforcement of a money 
judgment by a governmental unit and the commencement or con-
tinuation of litigation to collect taxes or to pursue some govern-
mental objective not embraced within the units "police or regulat-
ory power" apparently are subject to the statutory stay. Indeed; 
the managers of the bills point out that "[t]his section is intended to 
be given a narrow construction in order to permit governmental 
units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and 
not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a 
pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or property of the es-
tate. " 115 
Nevertheless, the United States and the state governments can 
be expected to invoke sovereign immunity when the debtor or 
trustee seeks the shelter of the stay. The House and Senate Re-
ports state that section 362 and the sections empowering the bank-
ruptcy court to issue injunctive orders "are intended to be an ex-
press waiver of sovereign immunity of the Federal government," 
and an assertion of the bankruptcy power in derogation of the 
sovereign immunity of the several states.11 6 
Trucking Inc., 396 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Okla. 1975) (Rule 401 held inoperative against an ac-
tion brought by the Secretary of Labor to enjoin violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
and to restrain nonpayment of overtime due employees of bankrupt); In re Joydon, Inc., 17 
Collier Bankr. Cas. 86, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 166 (Ref., N.D. Ohio 1978) (Rule 401 held not to 
apply to an action instituted by the Department of Labor alleging violation of the Service 
Contract Act of 1965); In re Fortiner Realty Co., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,I 66,924 (Ref., 
M.D. Fla. 1978) (Rule 401 held not to authorize a stay of disciplinary proceedings against a 
real estate broker by a state commission). Although the injunctive relief sought by the Secre-
tary of Labor in the Brennan case, 396 F. Supp. at 618, would require the payment of wage 
claims which might have been dischargeable, at least in part, the court declined to regard the 
action as one brought to collect a debt. Cf. Civil Aeronautics Board v. Tour Travel· Enter-
prises, 440 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (automatic stays of Rules 401 and 601 held 
inapplicable to action by CAB to enjoin bankrupt from violating Federal Aviation Act and 
Board's regulations); In re Citizens Loan & Sav. Co., BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ,I 66,497 
(Ref., W.D. Mo. 1977) (SEC permitted to sue to enjoin violation of federal securities laws); 
In re Richie's Villa Capri, Inc., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 144 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1977) (city's en-
forcement of a municipal ordinance by imposition of penalty for building violations held not 
subject to stay under Rule 401). 
113 HOUSE REPORT, supra note i4, at 343; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 52. 
11 • HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 343. Cf. In re Joydon, Inc., 17 Collier Bankr. Cas. 86, 
90-91, 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 166, 168 (Ref., N.D. Ohio 1978) (Rule 401 held inapplicable to an 
action by the Department of Labor to redress violations by a bankrupt of a federal minimun 
wage act but jurisdiction of the court retained to determine the validity and priority of claims 
filed by the Department of Labor on behalf of the bankrupt's employees). 
115 124 Co NG. REC. Hl 1,092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 
CONG. REC. Sl7,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)(statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
116 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 342; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 52. The Re-
ports could well have cited 5 U .S.C. §§ 702-703 (1976) as collateral support for their position 
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The purpose expressed in these reports is substantially 
strengthened by an amendment of section 106 made during the 
joint House and Senate consideration of the new bankruptcy 
legislation. Under the version of section 106 as it originally passed 
both houses of Congress, the government could have argued with 
considerable success that a waiver of sovereign immunity by any 
governmental unit would depend on the filing of a proof of claim or 
interest by the unit involved .11 7 The section thus could have been 
construed as overruling the many cases that have held the govern-
ment suable under section 2a(2A) and (12) of the Bankruptcy Act 
when the debtor seeks a determination of dischargeability of tax or 
other governmental claim.11 8 The courts have rejected as immate-
rial to their jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act that the govern-
mental unit has filed no proof of claim. Section 106(c) as finally 
enacted provides that notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign 
immunity, any provision of Title 11 referring to "creditor," "en-
tity," or "governmental unit" applies to governmental units, and 
''a determination by the court of an issue arising under such provi-
sion binds governmental units." According to the legislative his-
tory, the purpose is "to comply with the requirement in case law 
that an express waiver of sovereign immunity is required in order 
to be effective." 11 9 Although more guardedly drafted, section 106 
comes close to adopting the broad provision for general applicabil-
ity of the bankruptcy laws to the federal or state government that 
had been recommended by the Commission on the Bankruptcy 
Laws. 120 The scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity is essen-
tially a matter of determining congressional intent. 
that Congress has waived sovereign immunity as a defense to actions seeking only injunctive 
or declaratory relief. See also Verran v. United States Treasury Dep't, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 47 
(E.D. Mich. 1978). . . 
117 Under the version of§ 106 that originally passed the House and the Senate, a govern-
mental unit that files a proof of claim would be deemed to have waived sovereign immunity 
with respect to any compulsory counterclaim but to have submitted only to an offset of a 
permissive counterclaim against its own allowed claim or interest. See HousE REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 317; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 29-30. 
118 See, e.g., Gwilliam v. United States, 519 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Durensky, 377 
F. Supp. 798 (N.D. Tex. 1974), appeal dismissed, 519 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975). 
Section 2a(2A) of the Bankruptcy Act vests jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court to deter-
mine the amount and legality of any unpaid tax unless the issue has been previously con-
tested and decided by a competent tnbunal. Section 2a(l2) empowers the court to determine 
the dischargeability of debts and to render judgments thereon. See Plumb, supra note 97, at 
1396-99. The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to determine tax liability is retained and 
considerably extended in § 505 of Title I I. 
119 124 CONG. REC. Hil,091 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 
CoNG. REc. SI7,407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
1 
•• Section 1-104 of the Commission's proposed Bankruptcy Act reads in part as follows: 
''All provisions of this Act shall apply to the United States and to every department, agency, 
and instrumentality thereof, and to every state and every subdivision thereof except where 
otherwise specifically provided." COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at IO. 
Section 106(c) appears to make Title I I and determinations by the bankruptcy court there-
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5. Setoff of Claims and Debts Involving Commodity Contracts 
- A sixth paragraph of section 362(b) excepts from the stay the 
setoff of any mutual debt and claim ''that are commodity futures 
contracts, forward commodity contracts, leverage transactions, 
options, warrants, rights to purchase or sell commodity futures 
contracts or securities, or options to purchase or sell commodities 
of securities." 121 This paragraph presumably applies only in liqui-
dations of commodity brokers, which are governed by sections 
761-766. The terms "commodity contract" and "leverage transac-
tion" are defined in section 761 of Title 11. The Senate Report em-
phasizes the special need for expeditious administration of com-
modity broker liquidations. 122 Inferably, freedom in the exercise of 
the right of setoff will facilitate the settlement of the affairs of in-
solvent commodity brokers. Section 763(c), however, explicitly 
prohibits the offset of the net equity in one customer's account 
against the net equity in any other customer's account. 
6. Foreclosure of Insured Mortgages of Multiple Housing Units 
by HUD-A seventh paragraph in section 362(b) excepts from the 
operation of the stay the commencement of an action by the Secre-
tary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose an insured 
mortgage of five or more living units. 123 Section 263 of the Bank-
under fully applicable to every governmental unit insofar as it may be acting or proceeding 
against the debtor or its property. Subsection (c) is subject to subsections (a) and (b) of sec-
tion 106, but it is not apparent how these subsections limit the scope of subsection (c). Sub-
section (a) is a declaration of waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to any claim against 
a governmental unit that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as that underlying 
a governmental unit's claim. Subsection (b) of section 106 requires an offset against an al-
lowed claim or interest of a governmental unit of any claim belonging to the estate against 
the governmental unit. The allowability of neither the counterclaim nor the offset depends 
on the filing of a proof of claim by the governmental unit, as had been required under the 
earlier version of section 106(a), (b), passed by the House and Senate. 
121 The considerations involved in establishing a separate subchapter of Title 11 to deal 
with liquidations of commodity brokers are set out in the HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 
269-73. See also id. at 390-93; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 7-8, 104-09. 
122 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 8. 
123 The paragraph bars "tile commencement of any action by the Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust." 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b) 
(West Supp. 1979). A deed of trust in this context is a form of mortgage. G. OseoRNE, 
MORTGAGES§ 17 (2d ed. 1970). 
The mortgages covered by the exception of paragraph (b)(7) must be insured, or have been 
formerly insured, under the National Housing Act. The reference to former insurance is un-
doubtedly intended to neutralize an argument that the insurance feature is no longer neces-
sary or operative once the government has taken an insured mortgage by assignment, and 
that relief from enforcement of the mortgage ought to be available in the bankruptcy court as 
if it had never been insured. Such an argument was made and rejected in In re Bristol Hills 
Apt., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 164, 165-66 (Ref., E.D. Mich. 1978). 
S. 2266 as passed originally by the Senate contained a broader dispensation for the Secre-
tary of HUD in enforcing mortgages insured and formerly insured under the Housing Act. 
The automatic stay of § 362(a) would have been rendered inoperative as against either the 
commencement or the continuation of a foreclosure irrespective of whether the Secretary 
proceeded by judicial action or by exercise of a power of sale. Moreover, action to obtain 
possession as a mortgagee in possession would have been freed from the effect of the stay. 
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ruptcy Act precludes applicability of Chapter X to a mortgage in-
sured pursuant to the National Housing Act, and section 517 con-
tains a similar exclusion of such a mortgage from the application of 
Chapter XIl. 124 While section 362(b)(7) might appear to have ajus-
tification similar to that underlying these two provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act, it has a different scope and effect. 125 It is signifi-
cantly narrower in applying only to foreclosure of security interests 
in multiple housing units. Moreover, it purports only to permit the 
commencement of a judicial foreclosure action. 126 The operation 
of the automatic stay and the availability of other kinds of relief, 
including a modification of the secured obligation, against the Sec-
retary of HUD or the insured mortgagee are not otherwise affected 
by Title 11. Thus, even if foreclosure of an insured mortgage has 
been commenced before the filing of a petition by or against the 
mortgagor, the stay bars its continuation. 
7. Issuance of Notice of Tax Deficiency-The eighth and last 
paragraph of section 362(b) excludes the application of the stay to 
"the issuance to the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of 
tax deficiency." The term "notice of tax deficiency" clearly has 
reference to the statutory notice provided for in section 6212 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. The notice affords the taxpayer a 90-day 
opportunity within which to file a petition with the Tax Court be-
fore an assessment of the amount of the deficiency is made. The 
notice does not trigger the incidence of a tax lien under the Internal 
Revenue Code. The issuance of the notice of tax deficiency may be 
In explaining the rejection of the broad exception provided by S. 2266, Congressman Ed-
wards and Senator DeConcini pointed out that "[i]t would have permitted a particular gov-
ernmental unit to obtain a pecuniary advantage without a hearing on the merits contrary to 
the exceptions contained in sections 362(b)(4) and (5)." 124 CONG. REc. Hll,092 (daily ed. 
Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CoNG. REc. S17,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978), The substantial revision of 
this exception in its finally enacted form is convincing evidence of the Congressional intent 
that the exception granted the Secretary of HUD should be given a restricted interpretation. 
12 • The effect of these sections on the automatic stay imposed by Rules 10-601 and 12-43 is 
discussed in Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 214-15 & nn.208-09. 
125 Since the obligations secured by mortgages insured pursuant to the National Housing 
Act cannot be affected by the provisions of any chapter of the Bankruptcy Act other than 
Chapters X and XII, the special exceptions of§§ 263 and 517 apply only to cases under those 
chapters. 
The automatic stay of present Rule 601 operates against the enforcement of insured mort-
gages on property in the custody of the bankruptcy court, and Rule 13-401 stays foreclosure 
of insured mortgages of the debtor's property irrespective of custody. No reported cases 
have been found involving the operation of the stay against foreclosure of an insured mort-
gage in a bankruptcy or Chapter XIII case. 
The obligations secured by the mortgages described in§ 362(b)(7) can be affected in cases 
under Chapters 7, 11, and 13 of Title II. Except as limited by§ 362(b)(7), the automatic stay 
of§ 362(a) operates against the foreclosure of a mortgage insured or formerly insured under 
the National Housing Act, irrespective of the chapter in which the case concerning the 
debtor is pending. 
126 Congressman Edwards explained on the floor of the House that ''[t]he commencement 
of such an action is necessary for tax purposes." 124 Co NG. REc. Hl l,866 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 
1978) 
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regarded, however, as an act to collect a claim against the debtor 
that would be subject to the automatic stay but for this paragraph 
(8). As explained by the spokesmen for the conferees who recon-
ciled the House and Senate versions of the legislation, 127 the pur-
pose of allowing the issuance of the notice of deficiency is to enable 
the taxpayer debtor to take his personal tax case to the Tax Court, 
if the bankruptcy court authorizes him to do so by lifting the stay 
against the commencement of a proceeding before the Tax 
Court.128 The bankruptcy court may determine a debtor's federal 
tax liability under section 505, whether the court's jurisdiction is 
invoked by the government, the trustee, or the debtor. The stay of 
the commencement or continuation of any proceeding in the Tax 
Court concerning the debtor protects the debtor and the other in-
terested parties against a determination in that court unless and 
until the bankruptcy court lifts the stay. If the bankruptcy court 
does determine the merits of a tax claim against the debtor's estate, 
however, the debtor is not bound thereby, because the debtor is 
not deemed personally subject to the court'sjurisdiction.129 On the 
other hand, if before the Tax Court exercises its jurisdiction after 
the stay has been lifted, the bankruptcy court determines dis-
chargeability of the tax claim pursuant to section 523 on the request 
of either the government or the debtor, the determination bfods 
both parties and the bankruptcy court on the ground of res 
judicata. 130 
Section 362(b)(8) is not limited in terms to freeing from the stay 
the issuance of a notice of a federal tax deficiency, but it presuma-
bly operates only with respect to a process that functions in sub-
stantially the same way as the issuance of such a notice under the 
Internal Revenue Code. Particularly important is that paragraph (8) 
does not appear to limit the operation of the stay against an as-
sessment. Thus, if the issuance of a notice of a state tax deficiency 
operates as an assessment, the stay would nevertheless be effec-
tive against that event unless and until relief is obtained pursuant to 
section 362(d). 
127 124 CONG. REC. Hll,866 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 124 CoNG. 
REc. S17,426-27 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
128 The bankruptcy court may lift the stay to permit the debtor to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the Tax Court for determination of the debtor's personal liability while retaining jurisdiction 
to determine the claim allowable against the estate. The court may also lift the stay at the 
instance of the trustee to permit him to submit the question of the estate's liability to the Tax 
Court's jurisdiction if the debtor has commenced a proceeding there. See 124 CONG. REc. 
HI 1,110 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remards of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. Sl7,426 (daily 
ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
u 9 See 124 CoNG. REc. Hll,110 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 124 
CoNG. REc. Sl7,426-27 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). 
1ao Id. 
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8. Application by Sf PC for Protective Decree-Section 742 of 
Title 11 engrafts another exception on the scope of the stay of sec-
tion 362. Notwithstanding the automatic stay prescribed by section 
362, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, better known 
as SIPC, 131 may file an application for a protective decree under 
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.132 The filing of such 
an application operates to stay all proceedings in a case pending 
under Chapter 7. Section 742 does not say which debtor_s are or 
may be affected by it, and reference must be made to the Act of 
1970 for an indication of which debtors are amenable to liquidation 
pursuant to proceedings under the legislation. 
The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 provides a proce-
dure for the liquidation of a member of SIPC in financial difficulty. 
Membership in SIPC includes practically all broker-dealers except 
those whose business is exclusively intrastate or does not require 
them to have custody of their customers' funds or securities for 
any significant period of time. 133 Whenever SIPC determines that a 
member has failed, or is in danger of failing, to meet its obligations 
to customers and is insolvent or evidences financial difficulty in 
one of the other ways specified in the Act, SIPC may apply for a 
decree extending the protection of the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Actto the member's customers.134 The filing of the application 
on behalf of the customers of a debtor in a Chapter 7 case suspends 
the proceedings in the bankruptcy court "unless and until such ap-
plication is dismissed." 135 If SIPC completes the liquidation of the 
debtor pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 
the bankruptcy court must dismiss the case initiated under the Title 
131 The acronym is given statutory status by 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a) (1976), and 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 741(6) (West Supp. 1979). 
132 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976). 
133 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2) (1976). The Act technically applies only to members of SIPC. 
These are identified in the statute as brokers or dealers registered under § 15(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 or members· of national securities exchange-s, but certain 
classes of persons, such as brokers or dealers exclusively engaged in selling variable an-
nuities, are excluded. The coverage of the Act is substantially that stated in the text. See 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 266-67. 
134 15 u .s.c. § 78eee(a)(2)(1976); 3 COLLIER ,i,i 60.80-.81 (1973). 
135 11 U .S.C.A. § 742 (West Supp. 1979). Since a stockbroker cannot be a debtor under 
Chapter 11 or Chapter 13,- see § 109(d)-(e), the possibility that the automatic stay of§ 362 
may operate against SIPC' s filing an application for a protective decree is unlikely to arise in 
respect to a debtor in a case under either of these chapters. "Stockbroker" as defined in 
§ 101(39) is intended to encompass a dealer as well as a broker. HousE REPORT, supra note 
14, at 314; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 27. If a member of SIPC who is not a 
stockbroker as so defined becomes a debtor under Chapter 11 or 13, the stay of§ 362 oper-
ates against the filing of an application by SIPC for a protective decree, but SIPC may seek 
relief from the stay pursuant to § 362(d). SIPC is declared not to ''be an agency or estab-
lishment of the United States Government." 15 U .S.C. § 78ccc(a)(I) (1976). Accordingly, the 
exclusion by§ 362(b)(4) from the operation of the stay of an action or proceeding by a gov-
ernmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power affords the SIPC no immunity. See 
11 U .S.C.A. § 101(21) (West Supp. 1979). 
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11. This liquidation is carried out under the supervision of SIPC, 
the corporation created by the 1970 Act, and a United States dis-
trict court. 1 36 If a stockbroker is not subject to liquidation under 
the Act of 1970, or if SIPC does not opt to apply for a protective 
order, the estate of a broker may be administered under Chapter 7 
without interruption.137 
The filing of an application by SIPC for a protective decree for 
the customers of a bankrupt stockbroker or dealer does not violate 
the automatic stay provided by Rule 401 or Rule 601. Such an ap-
plication is neither an action on a provable debt nor a proceeding to 
enforce a lien. If an application by SIPC relates to a debtor in a 
case pending under a debtor relief chapter, the applicable automat-
ic stay would be violated, since such an application commences a 
court proceeding for the purpose of liquidating the estate of the 
debtor. 138 Section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Investor Protection Act, 
however, requires the court in which an application for a protective 
decree is filed to stay ''any pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclo-
sure, equity receivership, or other proceeding to reorganize, con-
serve, or liquidate the debtor or its property and any other suit 
against any receiver, conservator, or trustee of the debtor or its 
property. " 139 Moreover, the district court in which the application 
is filed has exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property. 140 
While such a grant would not necessarily deprive the bankruptcy 
court of power to determine whether SIPC is guilty of contempt in 
disregarding the automatic stay effected by the filing of the petition 
under the Bankruptcy Act,141 it is unlikely that a proceeding for 
such a purpose would be initiated or, if initiated, prosecuted to a 
conclusion adverse to SIPC. In any event, section 742 appears 
practically to eliminate the theoretical possibilities that exist under 
the Bankruptcy Act for violation of an automatic stay by SIPC. 
9. Repossession of Transportation Equipment by Purchase-
Money Creditors-The automatic stay is rendered inapplicable to 
the enforcement by certain creditors of their rights to take posses-
sion of transportation equipment constituting collateral for 
136 Liquidations under SIPA are discussed in Guttman, Broker-Dealer Bankruptcies, 48 
N. Y. U .L. REV. 887, 928-63 (1973); Note, The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: An 
Early Assessment, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 802 (1973); 3 COLLIER ,i,i 60.77-.95 (1973). 
137 A stockbroker may not be a debtor under any chapter of Title 11 except chapter 7. 11 
U.S.C.A. § 109(d), (e) (West Supp. 1979). 
138 The application is to be filed in a United States district court. 15 U .S.C. § 78eee(a)(2) 
(1976); Karmel & Weissman, Taking Stock of the Court's Jurisdiction in a Sf PA Liquidation, 
41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1974). 
139 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(2) (1976). 
140 Id. 
141 Cf. David v. Hooker Music, Ltd., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. 303, 309 (9th Cir. 1977) (au-
tomatic stay of Rule 401 held not to bar contempt proceedings in non bankruptcy court); Au-
tomatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 259 n.415. 
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purchase-money obligations. The provisions for this special pro-
tection are found in sections 1110 and 1168 of Chapter 11 142 and 
carry forward provisions found in sections 116(5) and (6)143 and 
770)144 of the Bankruptcy Act. The equipment recoverable without 
hindrance from the stay includes "aircraft, aircraft engines, propel-
lers, appliances, or spare parts," 145 "vessels," 146 and "rolling 
stock equipment or accessories used on such equipment, including 
superstructures and racks." 147 The injunctive power of the bank-
ruptcy court, as well as the automatic stay, is subject to the special 
rights of these purchase-money creditors .148 
The pertinent sections in Chapter 11 contain two qualifications 
on the inapplicability of the stay and the court's injunctive power. 
These qualifications appear to revive the stay and the court's in-
junctive power if, first, the trustee, with the court's approval, as-
sumes the obligations of the debtor under the security agreement 
within sixty days after the date of the order for relief; and, second, 
any prepetition default is cured within the same sixty-day period 
and any postpetition default is cured within thirty days, or within 
the sixty-day period if that is longer. 149 The sixty-day period may 
be extended by the trustee and the secured party, with the court's 
approval. 
The legislative reports explicating section 1110 insist that during 
the first sixty days after the order for relief in a Chapter 11 case, the 
142 Provision for financers of aircraft equipment and vessels is contained in 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ I 110. (West Supp. 1979). Identical provisions for financers of rolling stock equipment are 
found in II U.S.C.A. § 1166 (West Supp. 1979). The provision for rolling stock financers 
applies only in railroad reorganization cases. 
143 See 6 COLLIER ,r,r 3.34A-.34B (1977). 
144 See 5 COLLIER ,r 77.12, at 538 (1978). 
145 11 U .S.C.A. § I I IO (West Supp. 1979). These terms are defined in § IOI of the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976). 
146 ll U.S.C.A. § lll0 (West Supp. 1979). This term is defined in the Ship Mortgage Act of 
1920, § 30(8)(4), 46 u.s.c. § 911(4) (1976). 
147 II U.S.C.A. § ll66(a) (West Supp . .1979). These terms are an elaboration of the term, 
"rolling-stock equipment," as it appeared in § 77(i) of the Bankruptcy Act, from which it 
was derived. See note 144 supra. 
148 The rights specified in §§ l llO(a) and ll68(a) are "not affected by section 362 or 363 
[governing use, sale, or lease of property] of this title or by any power of the court to enjoin 
such taking of possession." Unlike the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that protect only 
lessors and conditional vendors in exercising the right to take possession of transportation 
equipment, the provisions of§§ lll0 and ll68 extend protection to the secured financers of. 
the acquisition of such property, however their interests are denominated. See HovsE RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at 240. The Uniform Commercial Code has made distinctions in rights 
and results based on differences in form obsolete. U.C.C. § 9-202, Official Comment; id 
§ 9-507, Official Comment I; Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express Sys., Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d 
Cir. 1966), on appeal after remand, 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967). 
149 Both §§ l ll0 and ll68 exclude from the defaults that must be cured by the trustee "a 
default of a kind specified in section 365(b)(2) of this title.'' Such a default is a breach of a 
provision relating to insolvency or financial condition of the debtor or similar provision, 
known generally as a "bankruptcy clause" or "ipso facto clause." The paragraphs of 
§§ 1110 and 1168 prescnbing the conditions for setting the stay in operation differ slightly as a 
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automatic stay prevents foreclosure, 150 but that is not what the 
section says. Rather the language indicates that the stay of section 
362 does not restrict the secured creditor's rights unless, within the 
times prescribed by the two subparagraphs of subsection (a), the 
trustee assumes and cures the defaults. If he does that before the 
secured creditor seizes the collateral, the creditor would have 
neither the right nor, presumably, the incentive to enforce his pos-
sessory rights. While the sixty-day and thirty-day periods are ap-
parently intended to be grace periods within which the trustee may 
assume and cure a default, the literal language of the section af-
fords him only a tenuous kind of dispensation. Prior to his assump-
tion and cure of the default, the trustee's right to retain and use the 
collateral can be cut off by exercise of the secured creditor's right 
to take possession during the sixty-day or thirty-day period. 151 If 
the trustee thereafter, but within one of the periods allowed him by 
the section, obtains court approval to assume the obligation of the 
assignment and cures a default by appropriate tender, the statute 
presumably entitles him to the protection of the stay against further 
enforcement of the lien by the secured creditor. Nothing in section 
362 or either of the special sections under consideration here, how-
ever, entitles him to restoration of possession. If either the sixty-
day or the thirty-day period lapses before the trustee assumes and 
cures, then it seems clear that neither the stay nor the injunctive 
power of the court can help the trustee against a secured creditor 
who stands on its rights. The secured creditor may, of course, be 
willing to allow the trustee to cure the default an'd to assume the 
debtor's obligations after the lapse of the statutory period·, and-the -
court is not likely to withhold its approval because of the delay. 
In view of the harshness of a literal application of the words of 
sections 1110 and 1168, the courts may be expected to reach results 
in their application that are more consistent with the explanations 
set out in the legislative reports than with the statutory text. 
result of a last-minute amendment of§ ll68(a). The trustee is required under this provision 
to cure a prepetition default that "is an event of default therewith" within the 60-day period, 
and to cure a postpetition default that occurs or becomes an event of default within the 
30-day or the 60-day period, whichever is the longer. The reference to "event of default" is 
intended to refer to an event that follows an earlier inchoate default and entitles the secured 
creditor to take action when it occurs to enforce its rights under the security agreement. 
150 See 124 CoNG. REc. Hll,102 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 
CONG. REc. Sl7,419 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); HousE REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 405, 423. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 117; but cf. SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 136. As the statements of Congressman Edwards and Senator De-
Concini in the Congressional Record, supra, point out, "[t]he discussion regarding aircraft 
and vessels likewise applies with respect to railroad rolling stock in a railroad reorganization 
under section 1168." 
15 1 If the rights of secured creditors "are not affected" by § 362 unless one of the condi-
tions specified in § 11 IO(a) is satisfied, there is nothing in the law to interfere with the exer-
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Moreover, it is not to be assumed that the courts will be deterred 
by the unconditional language of the sections under consideration 
from enjoining seizure of possession by the secured creditor that is 
not in strict compliance with the governing contract of the parties, 
or that is based on a security agreement subject to invalidation by 
the trustee because not perfected or because otherwise void-
able.152 
C. Duration of the Stay 
According to section 362(c)(l), the stay of any act against prop-
erty of the estate continues until the property is no longer property 
of the estate. 153 The paragraph is less explicit than the comparable 
provisions of the automatic stay rules, since neither section 362 nor 
any other provision of Title 11 specifies when property of the estate 
ceases to exist as such. The House Report says, illustratively, that 
the stay terminates when the property is sold, abandoned, or 
cise of the secured creditor's right prior to the trustee's performance of the condition so 
specified. Financiers secured by a right to take possession of such equipment as railroad 
rolling stock are not likely to be precipitate in exercising their possessory nghts. Such 
equipment is neither easily reduced to possession nor easily disposed of by sale. See The 
Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 760-62 (1977). 
152 As is pointed out in 124 CONG. REc. Hll,102 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of 
Rep. Edwards), §§ 1110 and 1168 do not require the trustee to assume any contract within the 
scope of either of these sections. The point is that if the trustee complies with the require-
ments of either section, the trustee is entitled to retain the collateral subject to the normal 
requirements of § 365, which governs the assumption of executory contracts. See also 124 
CONG. REc. Sl7,419 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
1 53 The property of the debtor and the property of the estate appear to be mutually exclu-
sive terms, although that proposition does not appear anywhere in the text of the most rele-
vant section, § 541, or in the House and Senate Reports. Thus, it is stated in both Reports 
that "[o]nce the estate is created, no interests in property of the estate remain in the debt-
or." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 368; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 83. The prop-
erty exempted by § 522 is property of the estate, and the reports declare that Lockwood v. 
Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903), is overruled. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 368; 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 82. Lockwood held that once the bankrupt's exempt 
property has been set aside by the bankruptcy court, the court's jurisdiction over the prop-
erty ceased. While the stated purpose of the new law is laudable, the text of the statute is far 
from clear in requiring the courts to effectuate the purpose. 
· The reference in § 3ti2{c1OT fo ''the stay of an act against property of the estate under 
subsection (a)" is also unclear. See notes 50-54 and 75-82 and the accompanying text supra. 
It presumably refers to the stay provided by paragraph (2), insofar as that stay applies to the 
enforcement of a judgment against property of the estate, paragraph (3), insofar as that stay 
applies to an act to obtain possession of property of the estate, and paragraph (4), insofar as 
it applies to the creation, perfection, and enforcement of liens against property of the estate. 
Other paragraphs that do not explicitly refer to the property of the estate may nevertheless 
prohibit an act that would affect the property of the estate; for example, paragraph (7) makes 
the stay operative against the setciff of any debt owing to the debtor. Does§ 362(c)(l) fix the 
duration of the stay prescribed by § 362(a)(7)? A permissible construction of § 362(c)(l) is 
that insofar as any act subject to the stay provided by subsection (a) would affect the prop-
erty of the estate, the stay terminates when the property ceases to be property of the estate. 
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exempted, 154 but the sections dealing with sale, 155 abandon-
ment, 156 and exemption157 do not indicate when these events have 
the effect of severing the property from the estate or even that they 
have that effect. Yet, the Report inexplicably continues, the stay 
against property of the debtor is not terminated "if the property 
leaves the estate and goes to the debtor. " 158 
The stay of any act other than one against the property of the 
estate continues until the case is closed or dismissed or the debtor 
is either granted or denied a discharge. The earliest of these even-
tualities terminates the stay under paragraph (2). 
The language and intent of subsection (c) apparently are similar 
to those of the automatic stay rules, but the operation of the stay 
against the creation, perfection, or enforcement of liens on the 
debtor's property after it is exempted is a significant extension. 159 
The survival of a stay after the closing of the case, now possible 
under Rule 401, is precluded by the statute. The statute also de-
parts from Rule 401 in terminating the stay when a discharge is 
... HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 343. 
155 II U.S.C.A. § 363 (West Supp. 1979). 
156 Id. § 554. 
157 Id. § 522. 
158 HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 343. The statute is particularly obscure in indicating 
when or how property of the estate leaves the estate when it is exempted, but it apparently 
does. Section 541(a) declares that the property of the estate comprises all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. Section 5220), how-
ever, says that property claimed as exempt in a list filed by the dehtor is exempt unless a 
party in interest objects. Presumably such a list will ordinarily be filed with the debtor's peti-
tion in a voluntary case and shortly after the entry of an order for relief in an involuntary 
case. Cf. Rules 108(b) and 403(a). Arguably, exempt property never enters and therefore 
never leaves the estate when the debtor claims his exemptions concurrently with the filing of 
the petition, ifno objection is raised to the claim. If objection is made, it is not clear whether 
the property claimed comes into the estate pending the resolution of the issue raised or only 
after there has been a determination adverse to the claim of exemption. In an involuntary 
case, all property of an individual debtor is, presumably, property of the estate until a claim 
of exemption is filed, whereupon the property listed as exempt leaves the estate. Again the 
status of the property claimed as exempt becomes unclear after an objection to the exemp-
tion is made and before the issues raised are resolved. 
To a considerable extent the automatic stay operates in the same way and to the same 
extent with respect to acts against the property of the debtor and acts against property of the 
estate. It is thus of no consequence, ocdinarily, for the purpose of construing § 362, whether 
property is categorized as property of the debtor or property of the estate. A difference does 
arise when an act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien securing a postpetition claim is taken or 
threatened. The automatic stay does not protect property of the debtor against such an act, 
though it does protect property of the estate. 
The House Report compounds confusion by saying that the stay against property of the 
debtor, which ex hypothesi cannot have been operative against property of the estate, does 
not terminate when the property leaves the estate to become property of the debtor. 
159 As indicated in note 153 supra. the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court under the 
Bankruptcy Act has not been deemed to extend to the protection of the bankrupt's exempt 
property after it has been set apart to him with the approval of the court. See J. MAC-
LACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY§ 167 (1956); Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bank-
ruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 678, 708-14 (1960); Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bank-
ruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REV. 445, 461-69 (1960). 
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granted as well as when it is denied, thus eliminating the theoretical 
duality of injunctive protection of a discharged bankrupt now pro-
vided by Rule 401 and section 14f(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Like the automatic stay of the rules, the statutory stay is also 
subject to termination, annulment, modification, or conditioning 
by action of the court. There is no provision comparable to sub-
division ( c) of four of the Rules, 160 which automatically nullifies 
the stay with respect to a creditor whose claim has not been 
scheduled and who does not file a claim within a short time after 
the first date set for the first meeting of creditors. After a request 
has been made for relief, however, there is a thirty-day limit on a 
stay of any act against property under the statute unless the court 
extends the stay after notice and hearing. 1 61 
Title 11 does not provide for a suspension of any statute of limita-
tions applicable to an action ori a claim that is subject to an automat-
ic stay provided under Title 11. 162 The creditor or other person 
subject to the stay is nevertheless allowed up to thirty days after 
notice of the termination of the stay under either section 362, 922, 
or 1301 for commencing any action that was not barred when the 
petition was filed. 163 The thirty-day period may thus start to run 
from notice of the court's granting relief, the closing or dismissal of 
the case, the grant or denial of the debtor's discharge, or, if the stay 
affects property of the estate, when the property ceases to belong 
to the estate. The provision clarifies and greatly simplifies a prob-
lem that may arise under the Bankruptcy Act. 164 A general result 
of the approach taken in Title 11 is to reduce the time heretofore 
available for the prosecution of a claim that remains enforceable 
against a debtor whose estate is administered under the bankruptcy 
laws. 165 The method and form of notice of most of the events that 
terminate stays under Title 11 will be governed by the Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure. Undoubtedly, a stay often will be termi-
160 Rules 401, 11-44, 12-43, and 13-401. 
161 See notes 169 and 170 and accompanying text infra. 
162 If any statute of limitations provides for suspension during the pendency of a case con-
cerning a debtor whose estate is being administered under the bankruptcy laws, however, 
the suspension is recognized as effective by § 108(c). An example of such a suspension is 
that provided by l.R.C. § 6503(b), which suspends collection of tax liabilities while the debt-
or's assets are in the control or custody of a court and for six months thereafter. See 124 
CONG. REc. HJJ,10') (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)(statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CoNG. REc. 
Sl7,426 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
163 11 U.S.C.A. § 108(c) (West Supp. 1979). 
164 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at Part IV D. 
165 If a debt is discharged,§ 524(a)(2) imposes "an injunction against the commencement 
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or any act, to collect, recover or 
offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the debtor, 
whetherornot discharge of such debt is waived." The authorization in§ J08(c) for extension 
of the period of limitations fixed for the bringing of an action on a claim against the debtor is 
thus made expressly inapplicable to actions on discharged claims. 
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nated with respect to particular persons without their getting any 
notice of the event. Thus, it will behoove the debtor to take steps to 
assure wide dissemination of information respecting such events. 
D. Relief from the Stay 
I. Procedure-The last four subsections of section 362 deal with 
relief from the automatic stay. Subsection (d) follows the basic pat-
tern of the comparable subdivision of the automatic stay rules. The 
mode of requesting relief is not specified, this being a matter left for 
the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure .166 The House Report explains 
that the procedure to gain relief from the automatic stay, "includ-
ing specification of adequate notice, form of hearing, or means by 
[sic] obtaining ex parte relief," is to be dealt with by the Rules or 
by local rules of court. 167 Any "party in interest" is authorized to 
request relief. Unless the term is restricted by a valid Rule of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure, 168 eligibility to seek relief is not limited to a per-
son holding a claim against the debtor. 
166 It is recommended that the form of the request for relief be prescribed by statute as a 
motion in a redraft of subsections (d)-(g) of§ 362 set out in Peitzman & Smith, The Secured 
Creditor's Complaint: Relief from the Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 65 
CALIF. L. REv. 1216, 1257-59 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Peitzman & Smith]. This redraft is 
further discussed in notes 169, 171, 174, and 194 infra. 
The justification for requiring a request for relief to be made by motion, according to 
Peitzman & Smith, is that the present practice under the Rules "has caused significant dif-
ficulties in the administration of bankruptcy estates" because it invites the debtor or trustee 
to assert affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Id. at 1259. The result is said to forestall 
prompt action on the request for relief from the stay. Cited were Judge Babitt's opinions in 
C. I. Mortgage Group v. Groundhog Mountain Corp., l Bankr. Ct. Dec. 923,924 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975), where he observed that prior to the Rules relief from a stay was granted or denied on 
motion, and in First Nat'! Bank v. Overmeyer Co., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 
where the debtor had filed counterclaims to the creditor's complaint seeking relief from the 
stay. Present practice under the Rules permits needed flexibility in hearing and acting on 
requests for relief from the stay, and the Rules contain several safeguards against the risk of 
undue delay in the consideration and disposition of a complaint seeking relief from the stay. 
See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 224 & n.247, 226 & n.250, 231-33 & nn.273-78. To 
suggest that a statutory matrix can free the courts to act more expeditiously in granting relief 
to movants fails to recognize the real causes of delay and creates obstructions to the de-
velopment by the courts of flexible procedures adaptable for varying situations. See note 169 
infra. 
Peitzman & Smith suggest that the need for all litigation over the continuation of a stay to 
be initiated by motion is the more imperative because the new bankruptcy court will have 
general jurisdiction. 65 CALIF. L. REv. at 1259-60. The party resisting the granting of relief 
will thus have an incentive to introduce into the trial "antitrust, securities fraud, and other 
complex claims for relief." Id. at 1260. The statutory provisions of the new law appear to be 
sufficiently nonrestrictive, however, to permit the courts to develop rules of procedure to 
deal adequately with the increased volume and diversity of litigation that may develop. 
The most direct attack on the problem of delay and dilatoriness in dealing with requests 
for relieffrom the stay is the imposition of a time limit on the effectiveness of the stay unless 
the court finds cause for its continuance. Section 362(e) addresses this matter by imposing 
30-day limits on the effectiveness of a stay of an act against property unless it is continued by 
the court after a hearing and on any interim between a preliminary and a final hearing. See 
notes 170-73 and the accompanying text infra. 
167 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 295. 
168 Title JI wisely does not undertake to define "party in interest." Although a definition 
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Subsection (e) addresses one of the criticisms most frequently 
heard concerning the operation of the automatic stay rules, and 
judicial inertia generally, in acting on motions for relief from in-
junctions entered by courts. 169 The subsection terminates a stay of 
any act against property of the estate thirty days after the request 
for relief has been made, unless the court orders its continuance 
after notice and hearing. 1 70 The subsection does not command a 
final determination of the issues raised by the request for relief 
within thirty days after it is filed. Notice must have been given and 
a hearing held, however, before the court may order a continuance 
beyond the thirty-day period even though its purpose is to preserve 
the status quo pending the final hearing. Moreover, in order to con-
tinue the stay after a preliminary hearing, the court is required to 
find that there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing re-
lief will prevail at the final hearing. The statute thus requires the 
court to take affirmative action to prolong a stay affecting property 
within the thirty-day period following the request for relief. 171 By a 
of the term appears to be procedural in character, it is not clear under 28 U.S.C. § 2075, as 
amended by Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 247, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), whether statutory terms may be 
defined by rules, particularly if the rule significantly narrows the scope of the statutory term. 
See notes 6-21 and the accompanying text supra. 
169 S. 2266 added a sentence to § 362(d) requiring that "[t]he hearing of such motion [re-
questing relief] shall take precedence over all matters except older matters of the same 
character." This provision would have carried out a recommendation of Peitzman & Smith, 
supra note 166, at 1258. A similar provision now appears in all the automatic stay rules ex-
cept Rule 9-4. The rule frequently is not observed. See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 
224 n.247. It may be doubted that casting such a rule in statutory form would force a dif-
ferent ordering of court calendars. Moreover, if such precedence should be made a statutory 
requirement, the statute would constrain the draftsmen of Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to 
maintain a formal deference to the statutory command, irrespective of competing exigen-
cies. The inappropriateness of such a requirement in reorganization proceedings was 
pointed out by the SEC in House Hearings, supra note 23, at 2199 (Report of SEC on Pro-
posed Bankruptcy Legislation (H.R. 31 and H.R. 32)): "Indeed by a succession of requests 
for relief under this provision, various lien creditors might delay or hinder the progress of the 
reorganization or even bring the reorganization proceeding to a complete halt." The state-
ments of Congressman Edwards and Senator DeConcini, in explaining on behalf of the con-
ferees the provisions of the final text of the amended bills, expressed a precatory anticipa-
tion "that the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will provide that those hearings will receive 
priority on the calendar." 124 CoNG. REc. Hll,092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. 
REc. Sl7,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). 
1 7° Compare Wauka Dev. Corp. v. Sosmer, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 230, 233 (Ref., N .D. Ga. 
1977)(in view of the "initial presumption" of the possibility of rehabilitation in Chapter XII, 
perhaps no Rule 12-43(d) hearing should be held earlier than three months after filing). 
The termination effected by the running of the 30-day period of subsection (e) affects only 
the party in interest who made the request for relief. 
Section 362(d) in S. 2266 would also have required the court to grant relief for cause within 
30 days of the hearing. Unless and until it found cause, however, the court would not be 
bound to grant relief from the stay. Since the hearing provided for in § 362 will ordinarily be 
held after notice, may continue for a number of days, and may itself be delaye<i by motions 
and procedural maneuvers, the 30-day limitation of subsection (e) is likely to be a more ef-
fective prod than would the proposed provision in the Senate bill. 
1 71 The Peitzman & Smith redraft of subsection (e) contained a detailed and rigid schedule 
for notices and the holding of preliminary hearings on motions by the party opposing relief 
from the stay. Peitzman & Smith, supra note 166, at 1258. The draftsmen of the new bank-
ruptcy law wisely and scrupulously avoided setting the number of days' notice that ought to 
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new paragraph (2) in section 362 (e), a final hearing must be com-
menced within thirty days after a preliminary hearing held pursuant 
to the subsection. 1 72 The new law does not preclude the possibility 
of an extension of the stay, either during the pendency of the final 
hearing after an order of continuance has been timely entered at the 
preliminary hearing, or during the pendency of an appeal. The 
House and Senate Reports contain exhortations against allowing 
the hearing on a request for relief from the stay to become cluttered 
with counterclaims and other collateral matters likely to delay de-
termination of the issues on which the right to relief depends. 1 73 
Subsection (f) of section 362 requires the court, without a hear-
ing, to grant whatever relief is necessary to prevent irreparable 
damage to the interest of an entity in property, if such damage will 
otherwise occur before there can be a hearing on notice. 174 This 
subsection continues in effect the provision for ex parte relief 
found in most of the automatic stay rules, 1 75 but the rules are 
phrased in permissive language. The substitution of mandatory 
language in the statute is unlikely to be regarded by the courts as a 
constraint on their discretion. The determination of "cause" is one 
that necessarily requires exercise of judicial judgment, involving 
precede hearings and prescribing other procedural details of a like nature. The Peitzman & 
Smith proposal would not have permitted the Rules to authorize courts to determine when 
preliminary hearings ought to be held in the light of the exigencies of the calendar and the 
usual considerations of procedural economy and convenience. 
172 The statute does not specify when the 30-day period begins to run -i.e., whether from 
the commencement of the preliminary hearing or from its conclusion. 
1 73 As the House Report pointed out: 
At the expedited hearing under subsection (e), and at all hearings on relief from 
the stay, the only issue will be the claim of the creditor and the lack of adequate 
protection or existence of other cause for relieffrom the stay. This hearing will not 
be the appropriate time at which to bring in other issues, such as counterclaims 
against the creditor on largely unrelated matters. Those counterclaims are not to be 
handled in the summary fashion that the preliminary hearing under this provision 
will be. Rather they will be the subject of more complete proceedings by the trust-
ees to recover property of the estate or to object to the allowance of a claim. 
HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 344. The Senate Report added that the approach of subsec-
tion (e) "is consistent with that taken in cases such as In re Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. 
Stipp. 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1977), that an action seeking relief from the stay is not the assertion of 
a claim which would give rise to the right or obligation to assert counterclaims." SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 55. The Essex Properties case is discussed in Automatic Stay/, 
supra note 3, at 229 & nn.265-69, 231 & nn.272-73. This procedure is similar to that now 
possible and contemplated under the Rules. See Automatic Stay /, supra note 3, at 221 
nn.235-37. 
1 74 Peitzman & Smith would revise subsection (0 by extending its length from 60 to 224 
words, incorporating most of the detail of the provisions for ex parte relief in the automatic 
stay rules but introducing the admonition that this kind of relief should be accorded only "in 
exceptional circumstances." Peitzman & Smith, supra note 166, at 1258. 
175 See Automatic Stay /, supra note 3, at 226 n.251. Ex parte relief is available under all 
the automatic stay rules except Rule 401, which operates only against in personam actions 
and judgments. The rules for debtor relief cases limit the operation of ex parte relief to stays 
of the enforcement of a lien or the commencement or continuation of a rehabilitation or 
liquidation proceeding. Ex parte relief under § 362(0, while not restricted to secured cred-
itors, is most likely to be used successfully by them. The possibility of obtaining ex parte 
relief against a stay of a rehabilitation or liquidation proceeding is not retained in § 362(0. 
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mixed questions of fact and law, and the trial court's determination 
will not be reversed unless abuse is shown. 1 76 inferably, the court 
can act on its own initiative under this subsection of the statute, 
although, of course, it is unlikely to do so. 
2. Grounds for Relief-The statute departs from the automatic 
stay rules in saying that the court "shall" (not merely "may") 
grant relief "for cause." One cause identified in subsection (d) of 
section 362 is "the lack of adequate protection of an interest in 
property" of the party requesting relief. 177 When adequate protec-
tion is required under this section, 178 three acceptable ways of 
providing it are set out in section 361. First, the trustee may be re-
quired to make periodic cash payments to the entity entitled to the 
protection in an amount sufficient to compensate for the decrease 
in the value of the entity's interest resulting from the stay .1 79 Sec-
ond, the entity may be provided with an alternative or additional 
lien equal in value to the decrease in value of the interest resulting 
from the stay .18° Finally, any other relief may be granted that will 
give the entity realization of the "indubitable equivalent" of its 
176 See 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i,i 65 .04[2], . 18[3] (2d ed. 1972); II C. WRIGHT & 
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2942 (1973); Developments in the Law: 
Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1063-67, 1070-72 (1965); Comment, The Statutory Injunc-
tion as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57 YALE L.J. 1023, 1026-34 (1948). 
1 77 The specification of this cause for granting relief appears to be a codification of the 
case law that has developed under the automatic stay rules. See Automatic Stay I, supra 
note 3, at 244-50. 
178 Adequate protection is required not only as a condition to the continuation of a stay 
under§ 362, but also as a condition to the use, sale, or lease of property by the trustee under 
§ 363 and the giving of security for a trustee's obligation under§ 364, when the stay, use, 
sale, lease, or giving of security may adversely affect the interest of another entity in prop-
erty. The concept of "adequate protection" is said to be "derived from the fifth amendment 
protection of property interests," but "[i]t is not intended to be confined strictly to the con-
stitutional protection required." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 339. The Bankruptcy Act 
does not contain any reference to a requirement for adequate protection in sections dealing 
with stays, injunctions, sales, leases, or issuance of certificates of indebtedness. The use of 
encumbered property by the trustee is not dealt with in the Bankruptcy Act at all. The 
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States had recommended that the reorgani-
zation chapter of its proposed Bankruptcy Act include a § 7-203 dealing with the use of 
leased or encumbered property during the pendency of the automatic stay. The lessor or 
secured party was authorized by subdivision (b)(2) of that section to seek relief from the stay 
unless afforded adequate protection. COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 237. 
1 79 This was the kind of adequate protection tendered and accepted in In re Bermec Corp., 
445 F .2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971), and other cases discussed in Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 
255 n.388. Curiously, the House Report indicates that the provision for the first method of 
adequate protection "is derived from In re Yale Express, Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(though in that case it is not clear whether the payments required were adequate to compen-
sate the secured creditors for their loss)." HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 339. Actually 
the court in the cited case rejected the secured creditors' application for periodic payments 
and relegated the applicants to "equitable consideration in the reorganization plan." In re 
Yale Express, Inc., 384 F.2d at 992 (citing In re New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 
147 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 884 (1945)). This method is not accorded any 
explicit recognition in § 361 or the legislative reports. 
180 As the Commission suggested in the note to its proposed § 7-202, additional security 
appropriately would be required only "if there is no equity or the equity is marginal.'' COM-
MISSION REPORT II, supra note 9. 
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interest in the property .181 
The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws had stated that "(a] 
benchmark in determining the adequacy of protection is the liqui-
dation value of the collateral at the date of the petition." 182 This 
statement was criticized by spokesmen for secured creditor inter-
ests, 183 and the draftsmen of section 361 and the accompanying 
legislative reports avoid making any unequivocal statement about 
the standard of valuation.184 
An additional ground for mandatory relief from the stay of an act 
against property is that the debtor has no equity in the property and 
that the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 185 
The thrust of this provision, set forth in section 362(d)(2), is elabo-
rated in statements made by the spokesmen for the conferees who 
explained the amendments reconciling the Senate and House bills: 
This section is intended to solve the problem of real prop-
erty mortgage foreclosures of property where the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure. The sec-
181 The House Report suggested as two forms of adequate protection that illustrate the 
last mode of adequate protection the following: (I) the guaranty by a third party "outside the 
judicial process" of compensation for any loss incurred in the case; and (2) permitting a se-
cured creditor to bid in his claim at the sale of the property and to offset the claim against the 
price bid in. HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 340. The second mode of protection is no 
more than permission to exercise one of the rights provided by his contract and accorded 
constitutional status in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 594-95 
(1935), discussed in Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 180. 
H.R. 8200 had included an additional mode of providing adequate protection, namely, the 
authorizing of an allowance as an administrative expense of an amount equal to the decrease 
in the value of the entity's interest attributable to the stay. This method was deleted from the 
final version of§ 361 because "in every case there is the uncertainty that the estate will have 
sufficient property to pay administrative expenses in full." 124 CONG. REC. Hll,092 (daily 
ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. Sl7, 408 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 
1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
182 COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 237. 
183 See Statement of Eli S. Silberfeld and Carroll G. Moore on Behalf of the National 
Commercial Finance Conference, Inc., in Hearings on S. 235 & S. 236 Before the Subcomm. 
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 510 (1975); Murphy, Use of Collateral in Business Rehabilitations: A Suggested 
Redrafting of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1483, 1508-09 
(1975); cf. Coogan, Broude, & Glatt, Comments on Some Reorganization Provisions of the 
Pending Bankruptcy Bills, 30 Bus. LAW. 1149, 1177 (1975). But see Webster, Collateral Con-
trol Decisions in Chapter Cases: Clear Rules v. Judicial Discretion, 51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 
235-36 (1977). 
184 The section does not specify how value is to be determined, nor does it specify 
when it is to be determined. These matters are left to case-by-case interpretation 
and development .... 
Neither is it expected that the courts will construe the term value to mean, in 
every case, forced sale liquidation value or full going concern value. 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 339; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 54. 
185 The lack of an equity in conjunction with an absence of a reasonable possibility for a 
successful reorganization has dictated the grant of relief from the stay in reorganization 
cases under the Rules. See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 239-43, 244-50. Section 
361(d)(2) is at least consonant with the case law regarding the role of a lack of equity in the 
application of the automatic stay rules. 
The original version of§ 362(d) in S. 2266 required relief to be granted whenever the court 
finds no equity in the property subject to the stay. That proposal would have overruled many 
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tion is not intended to apply if the business of the debtor is 
managing or leasing real property, such as a hotel opera-
tion, even though the debtor has no equity if the property 
is necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor. 186 
45 
Subparagraph (2) and the explication quoted in the text represent 
a substantial modification of a proposal embodied in section 362(d) 
as it originally passed the Senate. The Senate-approved version of 
the subsection declared that "property is not necessary to an effec-
tive reorganization of the debtor if it is real property in which no 
business is being conducted by the debtor other than the business 
of operating the real property and activities incidental thereto." In 
the next sentence, the subsection declared that "[w]here the 
debtor owns two or more properties for which an established busi-
ness enterprise has been created for the purpose of managing and 
leasing such property, however, the court may find that one or 
more of such properties are essential to the effective reorganization 
of such real estate management enterprise." 187 The Senate Report 
explained that "[t]he intent of this exception is to reach the single-
asset apartment type cases which involve primarily the tax-shelter 
investments and for which the bankruptcy laws have provided a 
too facile method to relay [sic] conditions, but not the operating 
shopping center and hotel cases where attempts at reorganization 
should be permitted.'' 188 
cases holding the existence of an equity not to be requisite to the continuation of an automa-
tic stay in debtor relief cases, particularly those pending under Chapter XII. See Automatic 
-Stay /, supra note 3, at 247-48 & nn.355-57. 
188 124 CONG. REC. HI 1,092-93 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 
CONG. REc. Sl7,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
187 S.2266 § 362(d). An additional sentence in the Senate version of§ 362(d) required 
property not necessary for an effective reorganization to be sold pursuant to § 363 if the 
court determined that the debtor had an equity in the property. 
188 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 53. The purpose of the draftsmen of the provision in 
the Senate bill was to cum what has been widely regarded as an abuse of Chapter XII of the 
Bankruptcy Act by investors in tax shelters whose objective is preservation of anticipated 
tax benefits rather than continuation of an economic enterprise for the benefit of the debtor, 
creditors, and the general public. The federal tax laws have made a limited partnership that 
acquires an apartment building by executing a mortgage securing a nonrecourse loan an at-
tractive investment for persons looking for a tax shelter. Glasser, Gimme Shelter: Reform of 
Real Estate Tax Shelters, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 267, 271-77 (1974); Note, Tax Classification 
of Limited Partnerships, 90 HARV. L. REv. 745, 781-83 (1977). The anticipations of many 
investors and lenders have been dashed by the depression of real estate values that has oc-
curred in the last five years. See Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need an 
Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAW. 1927 (1976). Chapter XII has been resorted to by many of the lim-
ited partnerships that have defaulted on payments due their mortgagees. See State Mut. Life 
Assur. Co. v. KRO Assoc., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 462, 467 (Ref., S.D.N.Y. 1978); Macey & 
Macey, The Chapter XII Chrysalis, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121-122 (1978); Reopened Chapter: 
Real Estate Slump Helps to Revive Use of Long-Dormant Bankruptcy Provision, Wall St. 
J., Sept. 29, 1976, at 48, col. 1. In the most celebrated case, In re Pine Gate Assoc., Ltd., 10 
Collier Bankr. Cas. 581 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1976), the bankruptcy court ruled that a plan may be 
confirmed under § 461(11), the cram-down provision of Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act, 
notwithstanding the dissent of all the secured creditors. The plan would provide for payment 
to the first mortgagee of an amount equal to the appraisal value of the mortgagee's collateral, 
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Under section 362(d), as enacted, the bankruptcy court may, but 
is not required to, find that an encumbered building which the 
debtor operates without having an equity in it is not essential to an 
effective reorganization. The subsection avoids constitutional 
doubts that surely would have clouded application of the Senate-
approved subsection. 
The House and Senate Reports take pains to explain that the 
grounds specified in the statute are not the only causes for relief. 189 
Other sufficient causes suggested in the reports include simply "a 
desire to permit an action to proceed to completion in another tri-
bunal," 190 and "the lack of any connection with or interference 
with the pending bankruptcy case. " 191 References are made to a 
divorce or child custody proceeding involving the debtor and to a 
probate proceeding in which the debtor is the executor or the ad-
ministrator of another's estate to illustrate situations where relief 
from the stay should be granted .192 "Generally, proceedings in 
which the debtor is a fiduciary, or involving postpetition activities 
of the debtor, need not be stayed because they bear no relationship 
to the purpose of the automatic stay, which is debtor protection 
from his creditors. " 193 
In any hearing on a request for relief from the stay, subsection 
(g) places the burden of proof with respect to the issue of the debt-
or's equity in property on the party requesting relief from the 
stay. 194 On all other issues the party opposing such relief has the 
consisting of an apartment building, permitting the partnership as the mortgagor to retain the 
property without liability for any deficiency to the secured creditors who had made non-
recourse loans on the property. See also In re Pine Gate Assoc., Ltd., 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. 
fJJ7 (Ref., N .D. Ga. 1977) (property valued by capitalization of current earnings plus an in-
crease of 20% from future earnings based on improvement in economic factors). Section 
213(e) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 704(d), has limited the availability of a tax 
shelter for certain activities, but the reform did not reach the use of the limited partnership in 
connection with real estate syndications. Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 
90 HARV. L. REv. 745, 781 (1977). 
189 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 343; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 52. 
190 HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 343. The Report might well have cited Foust v. Mun-
son S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77 (1936), and other cases cited in Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, 
at 235 n.291. 
191 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 343; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 52. An ap-
propriate reference might have been made to In re Laufer, 230 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1956), and 
the other cases cited in Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 236 n.294. 
192 HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 343. Appropriate citations would have included Her-
nandez v. Borgos, 343 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1965), and Herman v. Herman, 12 Collier Bank.r. 
Cas. 274 (W.D. Mich. 1977). 
193 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 343-44; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 52. 
194 There is no indication in§ 362(d) what standard of value should be applied in determin-
ing the existence of an equity. This matter is presumably left to the courts as it is in determin-
ing the adequacy of protection of the party seeking relief. See note 184 supra. 
The Peitzman & Smith redraft of subsection (d) required a party seeking continuation of a 
stay to show that he would be entitled to prevail at the final hearing. Peitzman & Smith, 
supra note 166, at 1258. In ruling at either a preliminary or final hearing, the court would be 
forbidden by subsection (g) of the redraft to order continuation of a stay unless it found that 
adequate protection had been provided for the party seeking relief. Id. at 1258-59. 
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burden of proof. 195 The House Report declared that "[t]he rules 
may not shift the burden of proof from the moving party;" 196 but 
when the final version of the enacted bills was presented to the two 
houses, it was explained that allocation of the burden of proof by 
such provisions as section 362(g) was "not intended to preclude the 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure from providing the same or a dif-
ferent burden of proof on other issues arising under those sections 
or otherwise." 197 Moreover, the courts presumably remain free to 
determine the rules governing the shift of the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence in light of such considerations as the diffi-
culty of proving nonessentiality of property for an effective reor-
ganization and the difficulty of establishing the existence of facts of 
which evidence is more accessible to one party than the other. 
E. Availability of Other Relief 
Unlike the last subdivision of all the automatic stay rules and 
section 85(e)(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, section 362 includes no 
provision that negates any inference that the section is a limitation 
on the power of the court to issue restraining orders and injunc-
tions or to order relief from stays, orders, and injunctions. As the 
House Report explains, the amplitude of the power of the bank-
ruptcy court to grant such relief is clear under the broad language 
of section 105(a) of Title 11 and other provisions of the new bank-
ruptcy law. 198 
Peitzman & Smith explained that their proposed subdivision (g) stated a substantive re-
quirement in lieu of merely imposing a burden of proof as does§ 362(g). This was said to be 
simply a way of assuring the secured creditor his constitutional right. Id. at 1262. Cited in 
support were the trio of cases dealing with the constitutionality of formi;r § 75(s) of the 
Bankruptcy Act: Wright v. Union Cent. Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940); Wright v. Vinton 
Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank 
v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). These cases impose no such constraint on the draftsmen of 
an automatic stay statute as assumed by Peitzman & Smith. See Countryman, Treatment of 
Secured Claims in Chapter Cases, 82 CoM. L.J. 349, 357-60 (1977). 
195 The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require the party seeking the continuation of a 
stay against lien enforcement to show that he is entitled thereto. See Automatic Stay I, supra 
note 3, at 226-27. In explicitly placing the burden of proof as to all issues other than the 
existence of an equity on the party opposing relief, the statute appears to ease the burden of 
the pi.rty seeking relief in cases where the stay does not operate against lien enforcement. 
On the other hand, the placement of the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in 
the property clearly lightens the load for the debtor or other party seeking continuation of a 
stay against lien enforcement. 
196 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 308. 
197 124 CONG. REc. Hll,108 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 
CONG. REc. S17,425 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
198 HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 342. Section 105(a) is derived from§ 2a(l5) of the 
Bankruptcy Act but does not include the provision that restricts the authority of a bank-
ruptcy judge to restrain a court. This restriction, however, is imposed by 28 U .S.C. § 1481, 
which nevertheless gives a bankruptcy court the powers of a court of equity, law, and admi-
ralty. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 342. 
The House Report suggests that the All Writs Statute also becomes available to the bank-
ruptcy court by virtue of§ 213 which amends 28 U .S.C. § 451 (1976) to include "bankruptcy 
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III. THE AUTOMATIC STAY IN CHAPTER 9 CASES 
Title 11 includes a special section applicable to the operation of 
the automatic stay in Chapter 9 cases. Section 901(a) makes section 
362 fully applicable in such cases, but section 922 supplements sec-
tion 362 by providing for an automatic stay exclusively applicable 
in cases under Chapter 9. 
Chapter 9 is only available as a vehicle for the adjustment of 
debts of a municipality, 199 but municipality is broadly defined to 
mean any ''political subdivision or public agency or instrumental-
ity of a State. " 200 The chapter is a revision of Chapter IX, as re-
cently amended by Congress in anticipation of the possible invoca-
tion of relief under the Bankruptcy Act by New York City.201 Sec-
tion 85(e) of the Bankruptcy Act provided, in paragraph (1), for a 
statutory stay against the following: 
(1) "the commencement or the continuation of any judi-
cial or other proceeding against the petitioner, its prop-
erty, or an officer or inhabitant of the petitioner, which 
seeks to enforce any claim against the petitioner''; 
(2) "an act or the commencement or the continuation of 
ajudicial or other proceeding which seeks to enforce a lien 
upon the property of the petitioner or a lien on or arising 
out of taxes or assessments due the petitioner"; and 
(3) "the enforcement of any set-off or counterclaim re-
lating to a contract, debt, or obligation of the, petitioner." 
Rule 9-4(a) is substantially identical in form and content to section 
85(e)(l) of the Act. 202 
Section 922(a)(l) of the new law supplements section 362(a) by 
staying any proceeding against an officer or inhabitant of a 
municipality-debtor to enforce a claim against the debtor. 203 It is 
courts" within the term "court of the United States" as used in Title 28. HousE REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 316-17. While this amendment is helpful in establishing the status of bank-
ruptcy courts under the new dispensation, it is not necessary to the court's invocation of the 
All Writs Statute. According to 28 U .S.C. § 1651 (1976), "all courts established by Act of 
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions 
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." That section, along with § 2a(l5) of the 
Bankruptcy Act and the inherent equity powers of a court of bankruptcy, has been held to 
authorize the issuance of an injunction by a bankruptcy judge. Schokbeton Industries, Inc. 
v. Schokbeton Products Corp., 466 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1972). 
199 Section l()')(c) restricts eligibility under Chapter 9 to a municipality which is authorized 
by state law to be a debtor under Chapter 9 and which is insolvent or unable to pay its debts 
as they mature. 
200 U.S.C.A. § 101(29) (West Supp. 1979). 
201 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (1976); H.R. REP.No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.REP. 
No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
202 The Chapter IX Rules became -effective on August l, 1976. 425 U.S. 1003 (1976). 
203 This provision is derived from§ 85(e)(I) of the Bankruptcy Act and Rule 9-4(a). The 
language used, however, is in considerable part a paraphrase of§ 362(a)(I). 
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immaterial for the purpose of this paragraph whether the claim 
arose or could have been sued on before or after the filing of the 
petition. Since the automatic stay of section 362(a)(l) does not op-
erate to bar a proceeding against the debtor on a postpetition 
claim, 204 the automatic stay of section 922(a)(l) has a longer reach 
with respect to a proceeding on such a claim against an officer or 
inhabitant than if the proceeding is directly against the 
municipality-debtor. 
Paragraph (2) of section 922(a) reaches only the enforcement of a 
lien on or arising out of taxes or assessments owed to the debtor. 
This provision apparently applies to an act or proceeding that 
might be or might have been initiated by or on behalf of the debtor. 
It carries over a feature of section 85(e)(l) of the prior Bankruptcy 
Act and Rule 9-4(e), but its scope and effect are not clear.205 
Subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of section 362 apply to the 
stay of section 922. These are the provisions that prescribe the du-
ration of the stay and the procedure for obtaining relief. 206 The du-
ration of the stay under section 362(c) is substantially identical to 
that provided in section 85(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and Rule 
9-4(b). The provisions governing the request for relief are consid-
erably more elaborate under subsections (d)-(g) of section 362 than 
those found in section 85(e)(3) of the Bankruptcy Act and Rule 
9-4(c). Rule 9-4(c) requires the party seeking continuation of the 
stay to "show that he is entitled thereto," whereas section 362(g) 
requires the party opposing relief from the stay to carry the burden 
of proof on all issues except the debtor's equity in the property. 207 
The difference between these provisions with respect to the burden 
of proof is likely to be inconsequential in Chapter 9 cases. 
IV. STAY OF ACTIONS AGAINST CODEBTORS IN CHAPTER 13 CASES 
The new bankruptcy law includes another section providing for 
an automatic stay. Section 1301 generally prohibits any act, or the 
commencement or continuation of any civil action, by a creditor of 
a Chapter 13 debtor to collect a consumer debt208 from an indi-
20• Nevertheless, the absence of an automatic stay against such a proceeding does not 
preclude the possibility of injunctive relief at the instance of the debtor. See note 198 and 
accompanying text supra. 
205 This feature appeared in S. 2597, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 805(a)(l975), the bill originally 
passed by the Senate as a new Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act. S. REP.No. 458, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2366 (1975). The Conference Report noted that§ 85(e) finally incorporated 
the provision of the Senate bill regarding the enforcement of liens on taxes or assessments 
b9t does not explain its purpose or effect. H.R. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976). 
206 See discussion at pp. 37-47 supra. 
201 See notes 194-95 and accompanying text supra. 
208 A "consumer debt" is one "incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, 
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victual who is liable as a surety or co-obligor. 209 
The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws had recommended the 
imposition of a moratorium, during the pendency of a rehabilitation 
case concerning a debtor with regular income, on the collection of 
a debt provided for by the plan from a codebtor of the petitioning 
debtor. 210 The Commission was informed that many petitioners 
under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act have been required to 
furnish cosigners or sureties on notes to cover consumer loans and 
consumer credit sales. While the bankruptcy court may and does 
enjoin collection of these debts from the borrower or buyer during 
the pendency of the Chapter XIII case,211 it cannot ordinarily bar 
the creditor from suing a co-obligor or surety who does not accept 
the plan. 212 When collection is enforced or threatened against a 
or household purpose." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(7) (West Supp. 1979). See also the text accom-
panying note 220 infra. 
209 The stay imposed by § 1301(a) protects • 'any individual that is liable on such debt with 
the debtor, or that secured such debt." The language is similar to that used in a comparable 
provision recommended by the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws. See the text accompany-
ing notes 210-13 infra. The language appears also in§ 509(a) as it did in Rule 304 and other 
Rules governing the filing of claims by codebtors. As explained in the Advisory Con1mittee's 
Note accompanying Rule 304, this language covers a surety, guarantor, indorser, codebtor, 
or one who secures a creditor of another by pledging collateral or otherwise creating a se-
curity interest in his own property without assuming any personal obligation to the creditor. 
See 12 COLLIER ,r 304.05 (1975); see also Countryman, Codebtors in Rehabilitation Proceed-
ings, 81 CoM. L.J. 383 (1976). 
Section 1301(a) does not undertake to protect one who may be but is not yet liable on the 
debt, unlike the Commission's recommended counterpart section. See COMMISSION REPORT 
I, supra note 9, at 214. Thus, arguably a guarantor or indorser whose liability is conditioned 
on an event or the performance of an act that has not occurred at the time the stay becomes 
effective would not be affected by it. It is probable, however, that omission of the reference 
to the words "or may be" was not intended to have any significance and that an indivrdual 
whose liability is contingent would be held to come within the protection of the section. In 
this connection it should be noted that Title 11 adopts the recommendations of the Commis-
sion on Bankruptcy Laws to eliminate the concept of provability as a condition of allowabil-
ity and dischargeability of a claim under the bankruptcy laws. See HousE REPORT, supra 
note 14, at 180; COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 9, at 213. As a result, the fact that a claim 
is contingent does not affect its amenability to administration under Title 11, though it may, 
of course, affect its value. 
210 CoMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 9, at 166-67; COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, 
§ 6-208, at 214. 
211 Prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Procedure for Chapter XIII cases, bank-
ruptcy courts routinely enjoined the collection of debts through judicial proceedings by cred-
itors of petitioning debtors pursuant to §§ 1 la and 614 of the Bankruptcy Act. 10 COLLIER 
,r 23.05 (1974). Rule 13-401 has imposed an automatic stay on such collection since the Chap-
ter XIII Rules became effective on October 1, 1973. 15 COLLIER ,r 13.401.04 (1975). 
212 COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 9, at 167: 
It is possible under present Chapter XIII for a plan to deal with the creditor's 
claim against the surety as well as the debtor [Schraer v. G.A.C. Finance Corp., 
408 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1969)], but a creditor with a right of action against a surety or 
other co-obligor may be unwilling to agree to a waiver or modification of his right 
against the other debtor. There is no means under the present law to compel a cred-
itor to give up any of his rights against the codebtors even though all the other cred-
itors approve the plan as proposed. 
When bankruptcy courts have enjoined creditors' actions to collect Chapter XIII debtors' 
obligations from codebtors, the injunctions consistently have been terminated on review in 
recognition of the applicability of§ 16 of the Bankruptcy Act in Chapter XIII cases. Reed v. 
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cosigner or surety who is a coworker or relative, the debtor is sub-
jected to enormous pressure to reimburse the accommodation 
party who has paid, or to pay the creditor directly in order to deter 
suit against the codebtor. Such a payment by the Chapter XIII 
debtor not only violates the terms of the plan213 but typically im-
pairs the ability of the debtor to complete performance of his obli-
gations under the plan. The Commission did not recommend any 
legislative restriction of creditors' ability to require consumer 
debtors to furnish cosigners on their obligations, but it viewed the 
provision for a moratorium as a desirable safeguard against prema-
ture termination of plans for debtors with regular income. 
A. The Scope of the Stay 
The Commission's proposal was strongly opposed by spokes-
men for the banking and consumer finance industry at hearings on 
the Commission's and the Bankruptcy Judges' bills,214 which in-
cluded provisions for a moratorium on collection of claims from 
codebtors in practically identical form and content. 215 One of the 
objections was that the proposal afforded relief to compensated 
sureties and endorsers of negotiable instruments. 216 Section 1301 of 
Title 11 responds to this criticism by making the stay inoperative 
against a codebtor who assumed his obligation in the ordinary 
course of business. This limitation is calculated to restrict the stay 
of section 1301 to its purpose to protect debtors and their families, 
friends, and coworkers from the harsh consequences of cosigning 
negotiable instruments imposed on them by the consumer finance 
industry. The Federal Trade Commission has found that cosigners 
for accommodation in nonbusiness situations are generally una-
ware of the legal significance of their acts. 217 Moreover, persons 
General Fin. Loan Co. of Nmfolk, 394 F.2d 509 (4th Cir. 1968); In re Shelor, 391 F. Supp. 
384 (W.D. Va. 1975); In re Lancaster, 38 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1941). 
213 A Chapter XIII plan must deal with all unsecured creditors in the same way. 10 COL-
LIER ,I 28.02 (1978). 
214 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 917-18, 1027-28, 1029-30. Some of the criticisms are 
discussed in the text accompanying notes 216 and 249 infra. 
215 Section 6-208 of H.R. 31 and S. 236 and§ 6-403 of H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1975). H.R. 32 and S. 235, the Bankruptcy Judges' bill, differed from the Commis-
sion's bill by including a proviso respecting negotiable instruments. See note 223.infra. 
216 See House Hearings, supra note 23, at 1027, 1030 (testimony of W.W. Vaughan of 
American Bankers Ass'n and Consumer Bankers Ass'n). The National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence proposed language to exclude the operation of the stay where the codebtor assumed the 
obligation in the ordinary course of business. House Hearings, supra note 23, at 1412, 1417, 
1423. 
21 7 The Federal Trade Commission has proposed a Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Prac-
tices that defines as an unfair credit practice the taking by a lender or retail installment seller 
in a consumer credit transaction of an obligation as a cosigner from anyone not a spouse of 
the debtor unless certain disclosures are made several days in advance of the signing. 40 
Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975); Report of the Presiding Officer on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule: 
Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. pt. 444, Pub. Record 264-86 (Aug. II, 1978). 
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engaged in the business of assuming suretyship obligations are or-
dinarily compensated.218 Such sureties do not need the protection 
of section 1301 because they can take account of the risk of delay or 
inability to obtain reimbursement from their principal debtors in 
the premiums they charge.219 
The purpose of restricting the protection of section 1301 to non-
business debtors is further implemented by the limitation of its 
prohibition to the collection of a consumer debt from an indi-
vidual. 220 Most compensated sureties are corporations.221 The 
Commission's proposal for a stay of collection from codebtors did 
not include these restrictions, but the Commission's proposal did 
not contemplate the eligibility of a debtor engaged in business for 
relief of the kind provided by Chapter 13. Such a debtor is far more 
likely to have as a codebtor a corporate surety or endorser and to 
be obligated on a business debt. As a result the stay of section 1301 
is not likely to have a significant role in reorganizations of small 
businesses under Chapter 13. 
Section 1301 prohibits not only the initiation or continuation of 
any civil action against a codebtor but any act to collect from him. 
If the codebtor has merely secured the debt, the prohibition clearly 
extends to any act of repossession or foreclosure out of court. The 
automatic stay of "any act to collect" a claim imposed by section 
362(a)(6), as previously noted,222 is intended to reach harassment 
and other nonjudicial methods of coercing or merely encouraging 
payment. It is manifest that section 1301(a) is intended to have the 
The National Commission on Consumer Finance recommended the enactment of legisla-
tion relieving any person other than a spouse of the principal obligor from liability as a 
cosigner W1less he receives a copy of an explanatory disclosure of the obligations assumed. 
Section 3.208 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is a response to this recommendation. 
218 Compensated sureties have the same right of reimbursement as accommodation 
sureties, L. SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP 236 (1950), but they are subject to the stay of § 362 
against collection of prepetition claims. See text accompanying notes 39-42 and 90-92 supra. 
A compensated surety's plight during the pendency of a Chapter 13 case concerning the 
principal debtor is not likely to generate moral pressure on the debtor to pay the surety or 
the creditor more or faster than provided by the plan. Corporate codebtors are not protected 
by the stay, whether or not they are compensated and whether or not their obligations were 
assumed in the ordinary course of the corporate business. On the other hand, an individual 
codebtor is protected even though he is compensated for assuming the obligation unless he 
did so in the ordinary course of his business. The business need not be that of acting as a 
surety. Thus, an individual who indorsed a check of the debtor in the course of his business 
falls outside the ambit of the statutory stay. 
219 See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY§ 82, Comment i (1941). The National Bankruptcy 
Conference suggested that the limitation on the stay should not be dependent on whether the 
codebtor was compensated since creditors could easily nullify the purpose of the provision 
by assuring that codebtors receive a nominal consideration. House Hearings, supra note 23, 
at 1412, 1423. 
220 See notes 208-09 and the accompanying text supra. 
221 RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY§ 82, Comment i (1941). 
222 See the text accompanying notes 90-92 supra. 
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same effect. Section 1301(b) explicitly provides, however, that a 
stay under that section does not preclude the presentment of a 
negotiable instrument or the giving of notice of dishonor of such an 
instrument. As the House Report explains·, this provision merely 
enables the creditor ''to preserve his substantive rights against the 
codebtor as required by applicable nonbankruptcy law." 223 Unless 
relief is obtained from the bankruptcy court, however, the stay 
provided by section 362 prevents the holder or any other party 
from attempting to collect on a negotiable instrument from the 
debtor, and section 1301 precludes any act against a protected 
codebtor other than presentment and notification of dishonor, ir-
respective of whether the debtor's or the codebtor's liability is as a 
maker or endorser.224 
B. Duration of the Stay; Statute of Limitations 
Section 1301(a) does not use the drafting approach employed in 
section 362 and the automatic stay rules of attaching the effect of a 
stay to the filing of a petition. 225 The statute simply imposes a pro-
hibition on the creditor that takes effect "after the order for relief 
under this chapter." Since only a voluntary petition can be filed 
under Chapter 13, the order of relief is simultaneous with the filing 
of an original petition in a Chapter 13 case. 226 If a Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 11 case is converted to one under Chapter 13, however, 
the order for relief under Chapter 13 means the conversion of the 
case to Chapter 13. 227 Thus, if an action has been commenced 
against a codebtor during the pendency of a Chapter 7 or Chapter 
11 case, the conversion of the case to Chapter 13 results in a prohibi-
tion of the continuation of the action if it could not have been in-
itiated against the codebtor of a Chapter 13 debtor. 
Section 1301(a) terminates the stay it provides when the Chapter 
13 case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under Chapter 7 
or Chapter 11. This limitation simply assures that the stay is con-
fined to its purpose to foster the completion of Chapter 13 plans. It 
223 HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 426. The subsection is an adaptation of a proviso 
originally appearing in § 6-403(a) of the Bankruptcy Judges' bill, H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1975). 
224 See House Hearings, supra note 23, at 1413, 1423, where a similar view was taken of 
the effect of an amendment of the Commission's bill proposed by the National Bankruptcy 
Conference. 
225 The bill follows the Commission's drafting approach, although the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference had proposed language that would parallel the automatic stay rules and 
that was followed in the drafting of§ 362. House Hearings, supra note 23, at 1417. Possible 
difficulties arising out of the drafting approach in§ 1301 are discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 228-29 infra. 
226 11 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West Supp. 1979). 
227 Id. § 348(b). 
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substantially follows the Commission's recommendation in this re-
spect. 22s 
The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws recommended that when 
a stay operates against the initiation of an action to collect a debt-
or's claim from a codebtor, the statute of limitations applicable to 
the commencement of such an action should be suspended until 
thirty days after the expiration of the stay.229 Section 108(c) does 
not suspend the operation of the statute of limitations but extends 
any period of limitations running against the creditor when the peti-
tion was filed to a date at least thirty days after notice of the termi-
nation or expiration of the stay. 230 
C. Relief from the Stay 
Subdivision (c) of section 1301 requires the bankruptcy court to 
grant relief on request by a party in intere st2 3 1 in three cir-
cumstances: 
(1) where the surety or co-obligor of the Chapter 13 debtor re-
ceived the consideration for the creditor's claim; 
(2) where the plan filed by the debtor does not propose to pay the 
claim; or 
(3) where the creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by 
the stay. 
The relief is to be commensurate with the justification. The stay is 
228 The duration of the stay of § 1301 is the same as that of § 362 with one exception. 
Under § 1301, the stay of acts and actions against a codebtor is coterminous with the pen-
dency of a Chapter 13 case and continues without regard to the granting or denial of a dis-
charge in the Chapter 13 case. See discussion of the termination of the stay under§ 362 in the 
text accompanying notes 153-65 supra. 
Arguably, the stay of§ 1301 should be terminated when a discharge is denied in the Chap-
ter 13 case. The objective of encouraging the debtor to complete performance of his plan is 
better served, however, by requiring the creditor who wishes to pursue the codebtor after 
denial of the debtor's discharge to show that relief from the stay is equitable and compatible 
with the purposes of the chapter. Since a discharge in a Chapter 13 case is granted only on 
the eve of closure of the case, the continuing operation of the stay during the interval be-
tween discharge and the closing can be consequential only in a rare case. In the rare case 
relief may be sought pursuant to subsection (b). Where the confirmed plan is a composition, 
a creditor is entitled to relief from the stay prior to and independently of the discharge with 
respect to the portion of the claim not proposed to be paid under the plan. See text accom-
panying note 239 infra. -
229 COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 214. 
230 The -cr;ditor gets more than the 30-day extension if the applicable period, phis any 
suspension prescribed by applicable law other than Title 11, has not run its course. The pro-
vision in § l08(c) invites litigation as to when or whether notice of the termination or expira-
tion of the stay was ever received. Neither the debtor nor the codebtor is likely to be im-
pelled to insure that a notice of the termination or expiration of the stay has been given to the 
creditor subject to the stay. Section l08(c) imposes on the creditor a duty of diligence in the 
pursuit of a codebtor if the period of limitations prescribed by nonbankruptcy law expires 
during the pendency of a stay prescribed by § 1301. 
231 The party in interest, of course, ordinarily will be the creditor subject to the stay, and 
tmtil a very late stage in the legislative process, § 130l(c) recognized only that a creditor 
(presumably the creditor subject to the stay) could request relief. A' 'party in interest" is not 
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to be modified rather than terminated when the reason for the relief 
extends only to part of the creditor's claim.232 
The first ground for relief is intended to permit the creditor to 
show that the codebtor is the principal, rather than the debtor, and 
therefore ought to be subject to liability without regard to the pen-
dency of the Chapter 13 case concerning the debtor.233 The deter-
mination of who received the consideration for the creditor's claim 
may be a difficult one, particularly when the debtor and codebtor 
are closely related.234 Where the debtor and codebtor have agreed 
between them that the codebtor is the party bound to perform, an 
act or action by the creditor to collect from the codebtor is not 
likely to exert pressure on the debtor to pay either the creditor or 
the codebtor. 235 This situation may arise even when the debtor re-
defined in the new law, but it was suggested in the explanation of the reconciliation of the 
bankruptcy bills that passed the two houses of Congress that "Rules of bankruptcy proce-
dure or court decisions will determine who is a party in interest for the particular purposes of 
the provision in question." 124 CONG. REc. Hll,QIJO (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of 
Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. S17,407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeCon-
cini). 
232 Thus, the creditor should be permitted to sue the co-obligor for only a part of the obli-
gation if only a part of the consideration went to the co-obligor; or if the plan provided for a 
composition rather than an extension; or if the creditor could show irreparable harm from 
the stay with respect to only part of the creditor's claim. 
233 See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 122, 426. Section 1301 does not incorporate a 
proposal of the National Bankruptcy Conference that a right of contribution or reimburse-
ment belonging to or acquired by the debtor may be enforced against a codebtor. House 
Hearings, supra note 23, at 1413, 1417, 1424. The draftsmen of the section presumably con-
cluded that the proposal expressed what is implied in § 1306, the section of Chapter 13 de-
scribing property of the estate. 
234 See, e.g., Bulkley v. Shaw, 289 N.Y. 133, 44 N.E.2d 398 (1942); L. SIMPSON, SURETY-
SHIP 147-52 (1950). 
235 The pressure exerted by collection efforts of a creditor against a codebtor of a Chapter 
13 debtor does not arise from the codebtor's right of reimbursement or subrogation against 
the debtor. The codebtor is, or at least may be, stayed from pursuing the debtor during the 
pendency of the Chapter 13 case, and the discharge received by the debtor pursuant to§ 1328 
is binding on the codebtor. It is the pressure to honor the moral obligation owed an accom-
modation party required to pay or threatened with suit that jeopardizes the performance of 
the obligations of the Chapter 13 plan. That obligation is onerous when the accommodation 
party is a relative, friend, or coworker,'particularly when the legal significance of the obliga-
tion was not understood when it was assumed. See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 121-22, 
426; House Hearings, supra note 23, at 1324 (statement of Bankruptcy Judge Conrad Cyr, 
suggesting that the most serious obstacle to completion of successful Chapter XIII plans is 
the inability to control creditor collection efforts against codebtors); id. at 1412-13, 1416-18, 
1422-24 (testimony of Professor Vern Countryman, explaining amendments of the Commis-
sion's§ 6-208 proposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference); The Bankruptcy Reform 
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 606-07 (1975) (testimony of Sam Plowden and 
Claude Rice of the Nat'I Ass'n of Chapter XIII trustees) [hereinafter cited as Senate 
Hearings]; cf. House Hearings, supra note 23, at 943-44 (statement of E.L. Sarason, Jr., of 
the National Consumer Law Center, Inc., urging discharge of cosigners' obligations in con-
sumer bankruptcies); NAT'L CoMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE 
U.S. 39 (1972). 
The rationale of the Commission's proposed § 6-208, discussed in the text accompanying 
notes 210-13 supra, was not understood by representatives of the Department of Justice who 
testified against the proposal at the hearings on bankruptcy act revision and reform: "The 
debtor can sufferno detriment from such collection action since the debtor's discharge abso-
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ceived the consideration for the claim held by the creditor. 236 
Thus, the objective of subsection (c)(l) might have been better 
achieved by authorizing relief to the extent that the creditor can 
show that the debtor was an accommodation party for the benefit 
of the codebtor, 237 or that the codebtor was the party ultimately 
liable for the debt. 238 
The second ground for relief recognizes that the creditor should 
not be precluded from seeking collection from the codebtor of any 
amount of the debt not provided for in the plan. If the plan offered 
by the debtor is a composition, it would be inequitable to the credi-
tor to prohibit him from collecting from the surety that portion of 
the debt the plan does not propose to pay. The creditor's right to 
payment to the full extent of the obligation assumed by the codeb-
tor is thus recognized, and the delay resulting from the stay is lim-
ited to that part of the obligation the Chapter 13 debtor is undertak-
ing to pay under the plan. Before the plan is finally confirmed, 
there may be some uncertainty as to the amount of the creditor's 
claim for which payment is offered. During the interim before con-
firmation, relief from the stay should be granted cautiously under 
section 1301(b)(2), lest it jeopardize the possibility of developing a 
feasible and fair plan. In any event, it is clear that if the plan does 
not propose to pay postpetition interest, attorneys' fees, and costs 
to which the creditor is entitled under his contract with the debtor, 
the creditor is not stayed from seeking collection of these items 
lutely extinguishes the debt. There can be no pressure on the debtor himself as a result of the 
creditor's collection against the co-debtor and the Commission's rationale fails." Senate 
Hearings, supra at 481, 488-89; House Hearings, supra note 23, at 2098-99. Only one un-
familiar with the realities of consumer credit could have made that observation in a prepared 
statement. Cf. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 459-60 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
236 An accommodation party need not have assumed the obligation without receiving 
value. "He may be a paid surety, or receive other compensation from the party accommo-
dated. He may even receive it from the payee, as where A and B buy goods and it is 
understood that A is to pay for all of them and that Bis to sign a note only as a surety for A." 
U.C.C. § 3-415, Official Comment 2. 
237 "An accomodation party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the pur-
pose of lending his name to another party to it." U.C.C. § 3-415(1). An accommodation 
party is or may be liable to the creditor even though the creditor knows of the accommoda-
tion. U.C.C. § 3-415(2). An accommodation party is not, however, liable to the party ac-
commodated; and if he pays the obligation, he is entitled to recourse against the party ac-
commodated. U.C.C. § 3-415(5). A party may be an accommodation party although he signs 
as a co-maker or as the only maker, and the party accommodated signs as an indorser. J. 
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§§ 13-12, 13-13 (1972). A surety is 
generally permitted to show his accommodation status by parol evidence except as against a 
holder in due course who has taken an instrument without notice of the accommodation. Id. 
at 430. 
238 Legislative reports accompanying the conference bill finally enacted stated that 
"where two co-debtors have agreed to share liabilities in a different manner than profits it is 
the individual who does not ultimately bear the liability that is protected by the stay under 
section 1301." 124 CONG. REc. Hll,106 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Ed-
wards); 124 Co NG. REc. S17,423 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). The 
reference to sharing profits is cryptic, but the statement appears to acknowledge that the 
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from the codebtor.239 
A third ground for relief is that the creditor's interest would be 
irreparably harmed by the stay. Examples of such harm suggested 
by the House Report include the filing of a bankruptcy petition by 
the codebtor, his threat to leave the locale, or his loss of ajob. 240 
The bankruptcy of the codebtor would trigger the stay of section 
362 on his behalf,241 however, and the codebtor's loss of a job 
would be likely to make the relief obtainable under section 
1301(b)(3) useless. 
A more realistic basis for relief under section 1301(c) would be a 
showing that the creditor's collateral is deteriorating, that the 
codebtor is likely to be unable to pay the debt at the end of the 
plan, and that the stay therefore subjects the creditor to the risk of 
irreparable loss.242 The many cases decided under the automatic 
stay rules that award relief on a showing of irreparable harm are 
pertinent here. 243 The court does not have the same freedom to re-
quire adequate protection of the creditor out of the codebtor's es-
tate as it does with respect to the debtor's estate,244 but relief from 
the stay may be withheld by the court on provision of adequate 
protection to the creditor by the codebtor from his or another's es-
tate. 245 
Section 1301(c) explicitly requires a "notice and hearing to pre-
cede the grant ofrelief from the.stay." As explained in accompany-
ing legislative reports,246 the requirement negates the power of the 
court to grant relief sua sponte but does not require the formality of 
a hearing and the taking of evidence when no party entitled to be 
heard requests it. 247 
receipt of consideration is not the critical matter. Rather it is or ought to be the locus of the 
ultimate liability on the debt as between the debtor and the codebtor. 
239 See HOUSE REPORT, supra no~ 14, at 122,426; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 138. 
240 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 426. 
241 See text accompanying notes 39 and 90-94 supra. 
242 The National Bankruptcy Conference proposed this ground for relief from the stay. 
House Hearings, supra note 23, at 1412, 1417, 1423. See also id. at 1027, 1030 (testimony of 
W.W. Vaughan of American Bankers Ass'n and Consumer Bankers Ass'n); SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at 139. 
243 See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 244-50. 
244 See discussion accompanying notes in-84 supra. 
245 Cf. In re Helmwood Apts., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1151, 1161 (Ref., N.D. Ga. 1976) (the court 
conditioned a stay of actions against a codebtor on the imposition of a restraint on transfers 
by the codebtor). 
246 124 CONG. REc. Hll,090 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarlcs of Rep. Edwards); 124 
CONG. REc. Sl7,407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarlcs of Sen. DeConcini). 
247 The phrase, "afternotice and hearing," is defined in§ 102(1). An actual hearing before 
the act can be authorized is excused not only in the circumstance set out in the text but also 
when "there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before such act must be 
done.'' It is doubtful that any such emergency will arise to justify an ex parte hearing under 
§ 1301(c). In any event, a prompt hearing after the act would be available to a party opposed 
to the grant of relief. 124 Co NG. REc. HI 1,090 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarlcs of Rep. 
Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. S17,407 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarlcs cl Sen. DeConcini). 
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Section 1301 contains no reference to burden of proof in proceed-
ings for relief from the stay. As a result, Rules of Bankruptcy Pro-
cedure may be prescribed to deal with that matter.248 In the ab-
sence of such rules, the courts will be free to allocate the burden in 
the light of considerations of fairness to the litigants and what com-
ports best with sound judicial administration. Ordinarily, the bur-
den of proof falls on the moving party, and the creditor seeking re-
lief should have the burden of establishing his right to relief and the 
extent of it. The creditor who has presented a prima facie case, 
however, should be able to shift the burden of going forward with 
the evidence to the codebtor in situations where the codebtor has 
superior access to the relevant facts. Such a shift would be appro-
priate, for example, if the creditor's request for relief is based on 
the contention that the codebtor assumed the obligation in the or-
dinary course of business or on the ground that the codebtor re-
ceived the consideration for the creditor's claim. 
D. Constitutional Considerations 
One of the objections made to the proposal in the Commission's 
and Bankruptcy Judges' bill to stay proceedings against a codebtor 
was that it is doubtful that Congress properly can provide relief 
under the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution to persons whose 
estates are not being administered under the bankruptcy laws.249 
The argument is far-fetched. It would be a whimsical reading of the 
clause, and one wholly inconsistent with its uniform construc-
tion,250 to deny Congress the power to restrict actions by creditors 
that interfere with rehabilitation of a financially distressed debtor 
The explicit requirement of a notice and hearing was inserted rather late in the legislative 
process but was implicit in the previously included language requiring a request for relief to 
be made by a creditor. See note 230 supra. The amendment achieved parallelism with 
§ 362(d). 
248 See 124 Co NG. REc. Hll,108 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 
CoNG. REc. S17,425 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). See also the text 
accompanying notes 194-97 supra. 
249 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 1027, 1030 (testimony of W.W. Vaughan of Ameri-
can Bankers Ass'n and Consumer Bankers Ass'n ); id. at 1365 (statement of the Nat'I Con-
sumer Fin. Ass'n); Senate Hearings, supra note 235, at 130 (statement of W.W. Vaughan of 
American Bankers Ass'n and Consumer Bankers Ass'n); id. at 143, 170 (testimony of A. 0. 
Wiese of the Nat'I Consumer Fin. Ass'n). 
250 A steadily expansive interpretation ... has been given to the Bankruptcy 
Clause during the one hundred and forty-eight years which have ensued [since the 
Constitution was originally proposed] .... The trail of that Clause is strewn with a 
host of unsuccessful objections based on constitutional grounds against the enact-
ment of various provisions, all of which are now regarded as perfectly orthodox 
features of a bankruptcy law. 
C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 8-9 (1935). See also·House Hear-
ings, supra note 23, at 164-67, 1431-33. 
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because of incidental benefits conferred by the restriction on per-
sons other than the debtor. The principal authority relied on for 
questioning the congressional power respecting the rights and obli-
gations of a surety is In re Nine North Church Street, Inc., 251 
where the court refused to uphold a permanent injunction against 
enforcement of a solvent surety's obligation. The court observed 
preliminarily that a modification of the contract rights of creditors 
"can only be justified by the bankruptcy power which extends only 
to the relief of insolvent or hard pressed debtors, " 252 but, as the 
court noted, in the case before it, suits against the surety did not 
embarrass the debtor undergoing reorganization and relief against 
such suits was therefore not essential to the debtor's reorganiza-
tion.253 Even in straight bankruptcy cases, bankruptcy courts have 
stayed actions of creditors against solvent sureties to prevent inter-
ference with the equitable administration of debtors' estates. 254 In 
addition, the power of the court to enjoin creditors' actions against 
third persons when necessary to accomplish the objectives of re-
habilitation under the debtor relief chapters has been recog-
nized.255 Congress has more than once exercised its bankruptcy 
power to provide relief to sureties in order to enhance the attain-
ment of the objectives of providing debtors a fresh start256 and ef-
fecting an equitable distribution of debtors' estates.257 The con-
stitutionality of this legislation has not been questioned seriously. 
2• 1 82 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1936). 
••• Id. at 188. 
2• 3 Id. at 188-89. 
254 See. e.g .. In re Federal Biscuit Co., 203 F. 37 (2d Cir. 1913); In re Eastern Comm'n & 
Imp. Co., 129 F. 847 (D. Mass. 1904). 
255 See, e.g., In re United Textile Print Works, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1935); In 
re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 11 F. Supp. 359, 374 (N .D.N. Y. 1935); Note, Modification of 
liability of Guarantor in Reorganization of Principal Debtor. 48 YALE L.J. 879 (1939); cf. 
Hanna, Corporate Reorganization and Suretyship. 46 CoLUM. L. REV. 219 (1946). 
In Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938), the Supreme Court held that a confirmation order 
of a bankruptcy court releasing a guarantor of bonds of the debtor was binding on the bond-
holders notwithstanding their contention that the order exceeded the bankruptcy court's 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court declined to express an opinion on the jurisdictional ques-
tion and predicated its ruling against tlle bondholders on resjudicata. In Doty v. Love, 295 
U.S. 64, 70-74 (1935), the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of a re-
lease of the personal liability of shareholders of a bank reorganized pursuant to a Mississippi 
statute. 
206 Section 76 of the Bankruptcy Act made any extension confirmed under § 74 or § 75 
applicable to obligations of sureties and other codebtors on the obligations extended by the 
confirmed plan. F. GILBERT, COLLIER ON BANKRUPfCY § 1641 (4th ed. 1937). Sections 74 
and 76 were repealed by the Chandler Act. 5 COLLIER ,i 99 (1976); id. ,i 341 (1943). 
m Sections 57i and 63a(8) of the Bankruptcy Act enable a surety to file a claim against the 
debtor's estate when the creditor neglects to do so, in order to assure that the surety's ulti-
mate obligation will be diminished to the extent of the dividends payable by the estate on the 
creditor's claim. 3 COLLIER ,I 57.21 (1974); 3A id. ,I 63.30 (1975). 
Section 67a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act discharges the liability of a surety under a releasing 
bond or like obligation to the extent of the value of indemnifying property recovered or in-
demnifying lien avoided by the trustee or debtor pursuant to§ 67a(3). See 4 COLLIER ,i 67.14 
(1975). 
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In any event, as the House Report pointed out, the creditor of a 
codebtor suffers no impairment of his substantive rights as a result 
of section 1301. 258 He is required to share with other creditors of 
the same class in receiving payments from the debtor during the 
operation of the plan under Chapter 13. Like them, he is subject to 
the delay imposed to enable the debtor to effect a rehabilitation of 
his financial condition. To the extent the plan does not propose to 
deal with the creditor's claim, he is entitled to be relieved from the 
stay of his collection from the codebtor. 259 
E. Enforcement and Sanctions 
Section 1301 is clearly intended to be self-executing, but the 
question may arise as to who has standing to require compliance by 
a creditor who is violating or threatening to violate it. It would be a 
hostile reading of the provision to give it only a defensive applica-
tion, i.e., to restrict its enforcement to affording the codebtor an 
affirmative defense when sued by the creditor. The codebtor, the 
trustee, and the debtor all appear to be parties in interest entitled to 
seek injunctive relief against a violation or threat of violation. The 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court conferred by the new bank-
ruptcy legislation seems ample to embrace such an action, 260 and 
the appropriate venue would be the bankruptcy court where the 
case of the principal debtor is pending. 261 
Since the statute does not speak to the allocation of the burden of 
proof in litigation under section 1301, that matter may be dealt with 
by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.262 In the absence of such 
rules, the courts must allocate the burden of proof case by case. 
Ordinarily, litigation involving section 1301 should be commenced 
by the creditor seeking relief, and, as previously noted,263 the cred-
258 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 122-23. 
259 An objection voiced at the Hearings on the Commission's and Bankruptcy Judges' bill 
that a stay of codebtors would restrict the availability of credit is particularly unconvincing. 
See House Hearings, supro note 23, at 1027, 1030, 1432; Senate Hearings, supra note 235, at 
130. The stay of§ 1301 is intended and expected to make plans of extension and composition 
under proposed Chapter 13 more attractive to wage earners than they are under present 
Chapter XIII. Creditors fare better when such plans are confirmed than they do when debt-
ors resort to bankruptcy, even when the plans are not fully performed. See D. STANLEY & 
M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 104-05 (1971). Insofar as the con-
tingency of a prospective borrower's resort to the bankruptcy laws enters into a creditor's 
calculus, the increased likelihood of a debtor's proposal of an extension or composition 
under the proposed law rather than opting for straight bankruptcy should enhance his cred-
itworthiness. 
280 The bankruptcy court is authorized to exercise "original but not exclusive jurisdiction 
of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11'' by 
28 U .S.C. § 1471(b), as added by Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
281 28 U.S.C. § 1473(a), as added by Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 243(a), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
262 See note 248 and the accompanying text supra. 
283 See the text following the reference to note 248 supra. 
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itor is in a better position to provide the relevant proof in such liti-
gation. The burden of proof under section 1301 should not depend, 
however, on who initiates the litigation. Thus, the burden should 
not fall on the codebtor to require the creditor to comply with sec-
tion 1301 where the creditor is seeking judicial assistance. Any 
other result would furnish an incentive to the creditor to force the 
codebtor to seek relief to compel compliance rather than to seek 
relief from the stay pursuant to section 1301(c). 
The lack of reference to a "stay" in section 1301(a) is likely to 
raise the question of what sanction may be imposed on a creditor 
who disregards the statutory prohibition. It is inferable that in 
enacting section 362 Congress intended the case law that has de-
veloped respecting the enforcement of automatic stays under the 
Bankruptcy Act and the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to apply to 
the automatic stay established by the statute. That law has recog-
nized the availability of contempt sanctions, at least with respect to 
the stays provided by the Rules. 264 It is likely to be argued on be-
half of one who has violated the statutory prohibition that punish-
ment for contempt of court is inappropriate. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that section 1301 is entitled "Stay of action against 
codebtor," and subdivision (c) of the section refers to "the stay 
provided by subsection (a) of this section." Moreover, the House 
and Senate Reports consistently refer to the "stay" effected by 
section 1301. 265 Therefore, the courts probably will make the same 
remedies available for violation of the prohibition of section 1301 as 
for disregard of the automatic stays of sections 362 and 922, includ-
ing the imposition of contempt sanctions. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The automatic stay is a legitimate and logical feature of adminis-
tration of estates under bankruptcy laws. In the United States such 
laws have the dual purpose of enabling the debtor to obtain a fresh 
start and affording creditors equitable shares of their debtor's as-
sets .or the assurance of satisfaction or security for their claims on 
equitable terms. It is necessary to prevent creditors from improv-
ing their positions by resort to means not under the control of the 
court of bankruptcy if the objective of equitable distribution, satis-
faction, or security is to be realized. Moreover, it is necessary to 
stay their efforts to collect from the debtor if the fresh start is to 
become effective. Under every bankruptcy act it has enacted, 
••• See Automatic Stay I, supra note 3, at 259-66. 
285 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 121-23, 426; SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 138-
39. 
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Congress has recognized the importance of granting the bank-
ruptcy court the power to stay creditors from pursuing their re-
medies and interests after the inception of proceedings by or 
against a debtor. Prior to the enactment of the new bankruptcy 
legislation, however, Congress has provided for an automatic stay 
only in legislation looking toward reorganization or rehabilitation. 
Nevertheless, the courts generally have acted on the premise that 
creditors must be stayed in straight bankruptcy as in reorganization 
and rehabilitation cases if its objectives are to be achieved. Thus, 
the automatic stays provided by the Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dures have tended merely to replace stays ordered by the courts on 
applications filed by petitioners. 
Litigation of the question whether a stay should be continued, 
terminated, or modified usually has followed patterns established 
prior to the promulgation of the Rules. Indeed, it was assumed and 
intended that debtors' and creditors' ultimate rights would not be 
significantly affected by the imposition of automatic stays by the 
Rules but that the relief contemplated under the bankruptcy laws 
would be frustrated by aggressive creditors less often after the. 
Rules became effective. 
Changes in bankruptcy law in this country generally and consis-
tently have tended to enhance the fresh start policy and the policy 
of equalizing creditors' rights against a debtor and his property. 
Each new step Congress has taken toward fulfilling these objec-
tives has been resisted as an offense against constitutional limita-
tions on its power; however, the constitutional arguments in the 
courts and the literature have resulted in a formidable array of au-
thority affirming the amplitude of the power of Congress to pursue 
broad bankruptcy objectives in all reasonable ways. The fresh start 
policy has been furthered by a series of congressional amendments 
during the sixties that limited the scope of exceptions and objec-
tions to discharge and reduced the risk that the policy would be 
frustrated by debtors' default and creditors' need. Meanwhile, 
debtors' rights were being enlarged at the expense of creditors' 
rights by an uneven, but nonetheless general, expansion of exemp-
tions by nonbankruptcy laws that have been enforceable under the 
Bankruptcy Act. Equality among creditors has been fostered by a 
series of amendments to the avoidance sections of the Act; these 
amendments have enabled the trustee in bankruptcy more easily 
and frequently to level advantages obtained by creditors before the 
inception of proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. Governmental 
priorities have been diminished by dint of great effort, and other 
kinds of priorities have been moderated. 
The general tenor of bankruptcy law toward more perfect equal-
ity among creditors was countered in the sixties by the widespread 
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adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and the decisional law 
construing it to enable secured creditors to obtain advantages over 
unsecured creditors far more easily than had been possible thereto-
fore in this country. In particular, the Code facilitated the use by 
lenders of the floating lien against inventory and accounts receiva-
ble that could not be defeated by the most diligent and deserving of 
unsecured creditors of a business debtor. Trailing the development 
of an improved and simplified law of chattel security was an in-
creasing recognition by bankruptcy courts of the need to protect a 
debtor's interest in retaining possession and use of encumbered 
property during the pendency of a debtor relief case. Decisional 
law recognizes that, notwithstanding the validity of a security 
interest, and notwithstanding default by the debtor that would enti-
tle the creditor to enforcement of his security interest under non-
bankruptcy law, an appropriate balancing of interests of the debt-
or, unsecured creditors, secured creditors, and other affected per-
sons may warrant a postponement of secured creditors' enforce-
ment rights. Court opinions not infrequently have come close to 
saying that Congress intended secured creditors' rights to be post-
poned and subordinated to the extent necessary to afford a debtor 
in financial distress an opportunity to rehabilitate unless rehabilita-
tion is a forlorn hope. Rehabilitation often is said to be preferable 
to liquidation, even though rehabilitation means postponement of 
the enforcement of a creditor's concededly valid security interest. 
The Rules did not change the law insofar as the possession of 
property by the debtor, the trustee, or a receiver is protected from 
lien enforcement without permission of the bankruptcy court. Nor 
did the Rules create any new right in the debtor, trustee, or re-
ceiver to stay proceedings pending against the debtor or its prop-
erty when a petition under the Bankruptcy Act is filed. The initia-
tive was shifted to the creditor to bring the issue before the bank-
ruptcy court whether or how long the stay of such proceedings 
should continue. This change in the procedural scenario assured 
every debtor of at least temporary protection against enforced col-
lection of dischargeable debts, and every estate of at least tempor-
ary protection against dismemberment by aggressive creditors. 
Most significantly, it provided breathing space for a debtor seeking 
rehabilitation in the form of a composition, extension, or reorgani-
zation. No longer was the availability of such relief dependent on 
the sophistication of counsel in preparing the papers for commenc-
ing a case under the Act. 
The unqualified language of the Rules has enabled some debtors 
to resort to the Bankruptcy Act for the purpose of obtaining refuge 
from enforcement of state and federal laws of a regulatory nature. 
Moreover, the imposition of a sweeping stay on lien enforcement 
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and proceedings against the debtor has enabled some debtors to 
exploit the advantages of delay that characterize the judicial pro-
cess. Although the Rules contain provisions designed to expedite 
determination of the issues presented by a party seeking relief from 
the stay, they do not preclude the possibility of irreparable injury 
to a creditor whose collateral deteriorates during the pendency of 
the proceedings on the request for relief. The injury to the creditor 
is aggravated when the court is dilatory in reaching a decision on 
whether to grant or deny relief. This unseemly result of the law's 
delay was not introduced by the Rules: criticism of courts for 
slowness to act on motion to terminate stays antedated the Rules. 
Experience under the Rules has not generated a demand that the 
automatic stay be eliminated in the overhaul of the bankruptcy 
laws that has been under consideration by Congress for the past 
decade. The effectiveness of the stay in serving the objectives of 
these laws has not been challenged or doubted. The attention of 
Congress rather has been directed to eliminating the opportunity 
provided by the Rules for frustrating enforcement by governmental 
officials of regulatory laws and to finding ways of minimizing the 
incidence of delay in disposing of deserving requests for relief. The 
device of permitting extension of a stay of lien enforcement only by 
affirmative action of the court within thirty days after receiving a 
request for relief and only after a hearing on the request seems a 
promising approach to abatement of the latter problem. The limita-
tion of the interim between a final and a preliminary hearing to 
thirty days is procrustean, but it is an understandable effort to deal 
with the most refractory problem in judicial administration. The 
withdrawal under the new law of authority from the Supreme Court 
to promulgate rules of procedure that depart from the statutory 
provisions preclude the development of other solutions by rules. 
The provision of the new legislation allowing governmental au-
thorities to enforce laws of a police nature without constraint by 
the stay is likewise a reasonable resolution of the conflicting 
policies involved. If governmental officials are required to seek re-
lief from the stay, as now provided by the Rules, it may be doubted 
that the enforcement of a regulatory scheme is likely to be jeopar-
dized or undermined. Further, it is entirely conceivable that en-
forcement during an interim before judicial relief can be obtained 
will be fatal to the hope of financial rehabilitation of a debtor. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to justify the position that the bank-
ruptcy courts should provide an automatic shelter from the en-
forcement of laws that persons other than debtors in Title 11 cases 
are required to observe. 
Insofar as the automatic stay provides a temporary respite from 
the enforced collection efforts of a minority of the creditors of a 
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debtor, it partakes of the essence of modem bankruptcy laws. Pro-
vision for such relief incurs the risk that creditors, especially cred-
'itors who have had the foresight and leverage to obtain security, 
may be prejudiced during the pendancy of the stay. The provisions 
of the new law that establish and regulate automatic stays repre-
sent a reasoned attempt to balance the competing considerations 
involved. The new Title 11 of the United States Code provides for a 
bankruptcy court of elevated dignity and prestige and enlarged 
jurisdiction. The elimination of the dischargeability of a debt under-
lying an action and of the custody of the bankruptcy courts as fac-
tors in defining the scope of an automatic stay is consonant with 
the grant of pervasive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court. Title 28 
withholds from the new court the power to enjoin another court, to 
punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the 
court, or to punish a contempt by imprisonment.266 These limita-
tions are relics of the inferior status from which the bankruptcy 
court in most respects has been lifted.267 They have more symbolic 
than real significance, however, and do not pose any serious threat 
to the ability of the court to exercise the jurisdiction granted. The 
automatic stay is an important adjunct to the court's expanded 
powers under the new dispensation. 
266 28 U .S.C. § 1481, as added by Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 
267 The denial of the power to enjoin another court derives from a proviso in§ 2a(l5) of the 
Bankruptcy Act. The limitations on the power to punish for contempt reflect a traditional 
reluctance to accord power to punish for contempts to referees in bankruptcy. Until 1973 
referees were not authorized to punish any contempt. Rule 920 of the Rules, promulgated in 
1973, authorized a referee to punish for contempt, civil or criminal, by imposing a fine of up 
to $250. Mr. Justice Douglas, in dissenting from the Supreme Court's order promulgating the 
Bankruptcy Rules, expressed particular objection to the grant of power to referees to punish 
for contempt. 411 U.S. 992 (1973). Section 1481 of Title 28, as added by Pub. L. No. 95-598, 
§ 241, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), does not appear to limit the power of the bankruptcy court to 
impose imprisonment or a fine of any amount for civil contempt, but the provision is more 
restrictive than Rule 920 insofar as it prohibits the bankruptcy court from punishing a crimi-
nal contempt committed outside the presence of the judge. 
